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 Arming the Second Amendment—
and Enforcing the Fourteenth 
William D. Araiza* 
Abstract 
This Article considers the timely and important question of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Second Amendment. Such 
legislation would test the Court’s current enforcement power 
doctrine, which ostensibly acknowledges a congressional role in 
vindicating constitutional rights while insisting on judicial 
supremacy in stating constitutional meaning. Second Amendment 
doctrine is complex and, importantly, methodologically varied. 
That complexity and variety would require the Court to perform a 
more nuanced, granular approach to the enforcement power than 
it has thus far in the modern era. 
Part II quickly recaps the Court’s Enforcement Clause 
jurisprudence. It concludes that its most recent enforcement power 
cases have left the doctrine adrift. Part III provides a similarly 
quick recap of the Supreme Court’s and lower federal courts’ 
Second Amendment jurisprudence. It identifies at least five steps 
that courts have taken in analyzing Second Amendment issues, 
which reflect varying levels of core constitutional meaning. That 
variation matters for the constitutionality of particular instances 
of congressional gun rights enforcement.  
Part IV examines, and finds wanting, the extant approaches 
to congruence and proportionality review as they might apply to 
Second Amendment enforcement legislation. Part V offers an 
alternative approach, in which review of gun rights enforcement 
legislation would account for the different constitutional status of 
each step of Second Amendment doctrine. Part VI applies this 
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approach, and works through its difficulties, using a hypothetical 
enforcement statute granting Americans the right to carry 
firearms in their automobiles. 
Part VII briefly and speculatively expands the scope of this 
proposed approach to legislation enforcing other substantive 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The difficulties posed by Second 
Amendment enforcement legislation would likely reappear in 
legislation enforcing such rights. It urges the Court to adopt an 
approach of this sort in order to credibly implement both its 
insistence on judicial supremacy in stating constitutional meaning 
and its acknowledgement of Congress’s role in vindicating 
constitutional rights. 
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I. Introduction 
When in 2008 the Supreme Court concluded that the Second 
Amendment bestowed a personal right to “keep and bear arms,”1 
and when two years later it concluded that that right applied in 
full to states via either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
or Privileges and Immunities Clauses,2 the Court embarked on a 
new doctrinal voyage.3 One of the more interesting, but less 
remarked-upon, aspects of that voyage concerns the breadth of 
                                                                                                     
 1. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There 
seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).  
 2. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (“[A] 
provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is 
fundamental . . . applies equally to the Federal Government and the States. We 
therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 3. Many scholars have commented on the implications of the novelty of 
the gun possession right that the Court found in Heller. See, e.g., Eugene 
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1478–81 
(2009) (noting that the Heller test and definition used in Heller to determine 
what is excluded from the term “arms” has unclear implications in its 
applicability); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553 
(2009) (arguing that “Heller’s greatest irony is that the mistakes and flaws of 
the opinion end up improving the decision”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of 
Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2015) (“This Article takes Heller’s conclusions 
about the original meaning of the Second Amendment as given and assesses 
whether they have produced—or even are capable of producing—an 
authentically originalist Second Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
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congressional power to enforce that right against states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.4 
The question of Congress’s power to enforce the Second 
Amendment has both a practical and doctrinal significance as 
well as a broader and more theoretical import. With regard to the 
former, it is relatively easy to envision a scenario in which 
Congress might wish to use its enforcement power in the gun 
rights context. Politically, the Second Amendment right is a 
popular one in many parts of the country (and, to be more 
granular, in many parts of many states), yet many states and 
localities still enact strong gun control measures.5 The resulting 
regulatory patchwork provides an attractive target for political 
forces that would prefer more robust gun possession rights at a 
broader (particularly national) level.6 At the same time, the 
                                                                                                     
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this [amendment].”). 
Indeed, this Article appears to be the first in-depth treatment of this issue since 
the Court adopted the individual rights understanding of the Second 
Amendment in Heller. Cf. Brannon Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment 
as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 
754, 762 (1998) (considering the possibilities of congressional enforcement of the 
Second Amendment under the then-recently-decided case of City of Boerne v. 
Flores). 
 5. For example, in the November 2016 elections, voters in California, 
Nevada, and Washington enacted gun control measures. The Nevada measure 
dealt with background checks. See THE BACKGROUND CHECK INITIATIVE, at 1 
(2014), http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=3440 (displaying Nevada’s 
laws on background checks). The Washington initiative restricted gun access for 
potentially dangerous persons. See INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 1491, at 1 (2016), 
https://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/Final Text_1016.pdf (“This act is 
designed to temporarily prevent individuals who are at high risk of harming 
themselves or other from accessing firearms . . . .”). While the California 
measure enacted an array of limitations and requirements related to gun 
possession. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAW, PROPOSITION 51, at 1 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop63 
(“This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 8 of Article II of the California Constitution.”). Maine 
voters rejected a proposal to impose background checks on certain types of gun 
transactions. See AN ACT TO REQUIRE BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR GUN SALES, at 4, 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/citizens/background.pdf (summarizing the 
rejected proposal). 
 6. This patchwork, and the seemingly conflicting preferences of different 
parts of the country, also raises the question of whether such local preferences 
can be accommodated under Second Amendment doctrine. See Joseph Blocher, 
Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 107 (2013) (arguing for such 
accommodation). In turn, the doctrine’s ability to accommodate different gun 
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tragic reality of continued mass shootings will spur continued 
pushes for gun control legislation, especially at the state and local 
level where such efforts are more likely to succeed. At the 
national level, the emergence of control of the political branches 
by a party committed to robust protection of guns rights makes it 
likely, or at the very least plausible, that federal legislative 
initiatives protecting such rights will emerge, especially when 
states and localities are seen as infringing them.  
From a doctrinal perspective, the Second Amendment 
provides an interesting enforcement power case study for the 
simple reason that the Enforcement Clause likely provides the 
most attractive constitutional foundation for federal gun rights 
legislation. Indeed, the enforcement power is almost tailor-made 
for legislation protecting gun possession, given the Court’s 
holding in United States v. Lopez7 that simple possession of a gun 
in a school zone is not conduct regulable under the commerce 
power.8  
                                                                                                     
regulation regimes raises the subsequent question about whether such 
flexibility militates against federal enforcement legislation enacting a single 
national rule governing the relevant gun regulation issue.  
 7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 8. See id. at 551 (holding that the Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 exceeds the 
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause because “[t]he Act neither 
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession 
be connected in any way to interstate commerce”). This fact also means that the 
enforcement power would play a role greater than simply providing a 
constitutional foundation for particular federal legislative remedies, in 
particular, damages remedies, which are unavailable when Congress regulates 
pursuant to its most important Article I powers. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that the Indian and Interstate 
Commerce Clauses do not allow Congress to impose retrospective remedies on 
non-consenting states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that 
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I 
powers . . . .”); but see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 375 n.12 
(2006) (carving out an exception for Congress’s Article I authority to enact 
bankruptcy laws). By contrast, the fact that the federal commerce power does 
not extend to regulating gun possession, whatever the remedies Congress 
chooses to authorize, makes the enforcement power crucial not just for purposes 
of the availability of certain remedies, but for the potential for federal regulation 
of any sort. To be sure, Congress might invoke its Article I Spending Clause 
power when regulating how states deal with gun possession. But even this 
power has come under new scrutiny. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (finding that Congress exceeded its Spending Clause 
power when it conditioned Medicaid grants to the states upon a state’s 
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The Second Amendment enforcement issue is also interesting 
for deeper and broader reasons. The first concerns methodology. 
The Supreme Court has insisted that the Second Amendment 
right is most appropriately identified by a historically-based 
original understanding of that right, rather than what Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller,9 
derided as “interest balancing.”10 This insistence that Second 
Amendment questions be decided based on originalist 
methodology—a methodology that Justice Scalia himself 
described as reflecting an understanding of the Constitution as 
“in its nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the 
courts”11—raises important questions about the appropriate role 
                                                                                                     
acceptance of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of the Medicaid program). 
The late Calvin Massey argued that the scope of the enforcement power 
should turn in part on whether the enforcement legislation in question made 
retrospective relief such as damages available. See Calvin Massey, Two Zones of 
Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (“When Congress seeks to prevent possible 
constitutional wrongs by enabling injured private parties to bring suit for 
damages, however, the meaning of congruence and proportionality becomes 
contested.”). In most enforcement power cases—for example, those dealing with 
legislation regulating state government employment discrimination—the stakes 
focus on the availability of retrospective relief, given the availability of the 
commerce power as a source for federal regulation of states as long as that 
regulation does not include a private right of action for damages. See Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985) (reasoning that 
Congress’s actions in providing San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
employees “the protections of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA 
contravened no affirmative limit on Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (“Even when the Constitution vests in 
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties 
against unconsenting States.”). The stakes are higher in the narrower gun 
context because the commerce power is unavailable to justify even that more 
limited federal regulation. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the 
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference 
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power . . . .”). The fact that federal 
enforcement of gun possession rights might have to rely fully on the 
enforcement power, as opposed to partially on the commerce power, would raise 
an additional complexity for the enforcement power if Professor Massey was 
correct that the analysis turns in part on the remedy Congress sought to impose. 
This Article brackets this important question.  
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 635. 
 11. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
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of Congress in contributing to that understanding. Simply put, 
what constitutes “appropriate”12 enforcement legislation when 
the rights Congress seeks to enforce are revealed through an 
analysis that is largely the work of judges? Indeed, what is 
Congress’s role when those rights are identified through 
originalist analysis that purports to uncover core constitutional 
meaning,13 rather than judicial doctrine that reflects doctrinal 
heuristics that are chosen largely because of their judicial 
manageability?14 
This theoretical question may soon have significant practical 
implications that encompass, but also go beyond, the Second 
Amendment. One striking aspect of the Court’s modern 
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence has been its recent focus on 
challenges to legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, 
rather than the Due Process Clause. Since the first two cases 
decided under the modern “congruence and proportionality” 
standard, both handed down nearly twenty years ago,15 the Court 
has decided only one significant Enforcement Clause case 
involving enforcement of substantive rights.16 The Court’s focus 
                                                                                                     
854 (1989). Indeed, Justice Scalia went on to suggest that underlying the 
principle of judicial review is “the perception that the Constitution . . . is in its 
nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the courts—an enactment that has 
a fixed meaning that is ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those 
learned in the law.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 13. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Courts, Culture, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 32 (2003) (“Scalia advocates originalism as a philosophy of constitutional 
interpretation because . . . it emphasizes that the ‘interpretation of the 
Constitution . . . is . . . essentially lawyers’ work . . . .’” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (1997))). 
 14. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges 
determine when classifications have that ‘fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation’ [required by equal protection].” (quoting Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). 
 15. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (creating a 
congruence and proportionality test to determine whether Congress has acted 
with proper authority and applying it to legislation enforcing the Free Exercise 
Clause); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 652 (1999) (applying the congruence and proportionality test to a 
statute defended as enforcing property rights in patents against state infringing 
conduct). 
 16. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (finding that Title 
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on equality-enforcing legislation has led to an enforcement power 
jurisprudence that has turned heavily on the level, or tier, of 
judicial protection enjoyed by the equality right Congress is 
seeking to vindicate.17 Because the Court has determined the 
level of scrutiny by sometimes-explicit invocations of the culture’s 
evolving understanding of equality,18 as well as by reference to 
the mediating principle of the protected group’s access to the 
political process,19 there has been ample, if sometimes 
unacknowledged, room for Congress to participate in the task of 
vindicating equality rights via legislation.20 
The protection of substantive rights may be different. To the 
extent originalist analysis insists that the scope and nature of a 
substantive right reflect an understanding of law that is “the 
business of the courts”21 to explicate, such rights may be more 
resistant to congressional attempts to contribute to their full 
vindication.22 Thus, the Court’s turn toward originalist analysis 
                                                                                                     
II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to 
the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). Another Enforcement Clause case dealing with 
substantive rights, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), is relatively 
less significant for purposes of understanding Enforcement Clause doctrine, but 
is nevertheless discussed at infra note 153 and infra note 278 and accompanying 
text. A final case, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013), 
considered Congress’s cognate power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which prohibits racial discrimination in voting. See infra notes 172–181 and 
accompanying text (discussing Shelby County). 
 17. See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining those cases). 
 18. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) 
(plurality opinion) (relying in part on legislative guidance when determining 
that sex discrimination is a serious national problem). 
 19. See id. at 685 (providing such a process-based approach to the level of 
scrutiny question); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 
(1985) (performing a similar analysis). 
 20. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 23–27 (noting this potential in the 
context of the Court’s early congruence and proportionality jurisprudence). 
 21. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854 (underlying the principle of judicial 
review is “the perception that the Constitution . . . is in its nature the sort of 
‘law’ that is the business of the courts”). 
 22. To be sure, one should not overstate this distinction between equality 
rights, whose vindication requires recourse to cultural understandings, and 
substantive rights, whose vindication turns on purely legal analysis. For 
example, to the extent that courts uncover unenumerated substantive due 
process rights via an analysis of the nation’s history and tradition, substantive 
due process methodology could be understood to require courts to consider how 
modern American culture has interacted with and related to that tradition. See, 
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when interpreting substantive constitutional rights, such as Bill 
of Rights provisions (as well as their incorporated analogues), 
may require a new approach to congruence and proportionality 
when attention turns to enforcement legislation, such as gun 
rights legislation, that aims at enforcing such rights. At the very 
least, such a new approach is required if the Court is to avoid the 
unacceptably restricted vision of the enforcement power that 
allows Congress only to craft remedies for judicially-determined 
constitutional violations.23 The Second Amendment provides an 
opportunity to consider this issue. But the resulting analysis will 
apply far more broadly than the gun possession right. 
The Second Amendment constitutes an excellent vehicle for 
this examination. Gun rights litigation is widespread, and the 
Court’s refusal to clarify its jurisprudence since incorporating the 
Second Amendment in 201024 means that lower courts have faced 
a wide variety of challenges with only limited Supreme Court 
guidance. The result has been a complex, multi-stage doctrine 
that takes Heller’s historical/originalist analysis only as its 
starting point.25 This complexity further distances potential 
Second Amendment enforcement issues from the mine run of the 
                                                                                                     
e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 85 (“[D]ue process doctrine has historically engaged 
in remarkably candid efforts to interpret and apply cultural values . . . .”). Such 
cultural engagement would also be required to the extent a judge adopted an 
approach to substantive due process methodology that self-consciously asked 
about the importance of the asserted right to one’s ability to live an autonomous 
life. See id. at 88 (“Instead of identifying constitutionally protected liberty 
interests by reference to the contemporary significance of tradition, it began to 
identify such interests by directly evaluating the intrinsic value of liberty 
itself.”). Similarly, an important element of Fourth Amendment doctrine—the 
question of whether Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
given context—requires courts to understand modern American culture. See 
generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 235–38 
(2015) [hereinafter ARAIZA, ENFORCING]. Thus, at least some substantive rights 
doctrines are heavily influenced by cultural understandings. 
 23. Since Boerne, only Justice Scalia has taken a position this extreme. See 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for this more limited 
understanding of the enforcement power in cases other than those evaluating 
racial equality enforcement legislation). 
 24. See infra notes 187–191 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s 
most recent opinions on the issue). 
 25. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) 
(explaining Heller’s originalist methodology). 
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Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence up to now, which has 
relied heavily on the general level of scrutiny appropriate for the 
particular type of discrimination Congress is seeking to deter.26 
But the Second Amendment is not the only substantive 
constitutional provision that is governed by such a complex 
doctrinal structure.27 Thus, the insights one gleans from the 
Second Amendment example may provide a useful template for 
future enforcement power issues. 
A particular facet of the Second Amendment provides a final 
reason for its usefulness as a case study. Lower court Second 
Amendment jurisprudence has sometimes involved claims of 
penumbral rights—that is, claims that the Second Amendment 
protects not just the right to possess a gun for self-defense, but 
also collateral rights such as the right to transport a gun, to 
conceal a gun on one’s person, and even the right to attain 
proficiency in the use of a gun, say, by accessing target range 
practice.28 If Congress legislates to protect such rights under the 
banner of enforcing the Second Amendment, the Court will be 
faced with an additional complicating factor when it reviews the 
constitutionality of such legislation. 
In short, legislation enforcing the Second Amendment is 
politically plausible, and will force the Court to apply its 
congruence and proportionality standard in a novel doctrinal and 
jurisprudential context. That challenge will be exacerbated by 
both the seeming complexity of Second Amendment doctrine as it 
has developed in the lower courts and the existence of penumbral 
Second Amendment rights that Congress may seek to protect. 
Both of these latter characteristics will increase the difficulty the 
Court will face when it considers Congress’s role in vindicating 
constitutional rights that the Court insists can be authoritatively 
                                                                                                     
 26. See supra note 8 (noting the interplay between the Enforcement Clause 
and the Second Amendment after Lopez).  
 27. See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 
23 CONST. COMMENT 227, 228 (2006) (noting the variety of doctrinal tests courts 
apply to different Bill of Rights provisions). 
 28. See, e.g., Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998, at 
*20 (D. N. Mar. I Sept. 28, 2016) (considering restrictions on transport); Peruta 
v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering 
restrictions on concealed carry); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (considering restrictions on firing ranges); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
846 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2017) (same). 
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identified only via a methodology that views law-stating as 
exclusively “the business of the courts.”29 Thus, an investigation 
into Congress’s power to arm the Second Amendment is 
important not just for reasons specific to that right. Rather, the 
conclusions we can draw about that power may be highly relevant 
to Congress’s other attempts to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment in contexts in which originalism plays a major role 
in constitutional analysis. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides part of 
the necessary background for this inquiry by telling, in an 
abbreviated fashion, the story of the enforcement power,30 
beginning with the foundational case of City of Boerne v. Flores.31 
This story focuses on the Court’s application of Boerne’s 
“congruence and proportionality” standard, both in the context of 
substantive, due process-based rights, and equality rights.32 
Comparing how the Court has applied that test to these two types 
of legislation suggests the difficulty the Court may face if and 
when it confronts legislation enforcing the Second Amendment. 
Part III provides the remainder of the necessary background 
by telling, in similarly abridged form, the story of Heller, its 
methodology for identifying the scope of the Second Amendment 
right, and the lower courts’ applications of Heller.33 While Heller 
did not purport to provide—and indeed, explicitly disclaimed any 
pretense to providing—a comprehensive answer to the question of 
what the Second Amendment protects and what it does not, its 
methodology, holding, and dicta will likely channel the Court’s 
future encounters with that right, both in its directly litigated 
form,34 and in the form of challenges to congressional legislation 
enforcing it. In particular, when two years after Heller, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 29. Scalia, supra note 11, at 854.  
 30. See infra Part II (describing the background necessary for this Article). 
 31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (setting a 
congruence and proportionality standard). 
 32. See infra Part II (highlighting the use of the congruence and 
proportionality standard).  
 33. See infra Part III (describing Second Amendment jurisprudence 
through an analysis of Heller). 
 34. See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) 
(applying Heller to the question of the protected status of possession of a stun 
gun). 
1812 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) 
held that the Second Amendment applies to states,35 the Court 
imported Heller’s main features and thus made them directly 
relevant to both litigation challenging state and local gun 
restrictions and congressional enforcement legislation.36 Part III 
considers the Second Amendment doctrine emerging from the 
lower courts, and what that doctrine suggests for efforts at 
congressional enforcement.37 
Part IV discusses how the extant Enforcement Clause 
doctrine set forth in Part II might apply to legislation enforcing 
the Second Amendment.38 It concludes that existing enforcement 
power doctrine is not fully up to the task of appropriately 
enforcing the Second Amendment.39 At least until recently, equal 
protection enforcement doctrine turned heavily on the suspect 
class status of the group that the enforcement legislation seeks to 
protect.40 Such suspect class analysis largely reflects courts’ 
institutional competence-based concerns about fuller judicial 
enforcement of the equal protection guarantee. These 
characteristics render the equal protection enforcement model 
inapt for the different context of the Second Amendment. Because 
Second Amendment doctrine does not reflect the same level of 
concern about institutional competence, the Second Amendment 
may be less underenforced, and thus less amenable to aggressive 
congressional supplementation via enforcement legislation. 
The cases considering congressional enforcement of due 
process rights fare no better as models. Those cases all considered 
rights better defined than the Second Amendment right.41 Those 
more precise definitions allowed the Court to compare 
meaningfully the enforced constitutional right with the 
                                                                                                     
 35. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 788 (2010) (applying the 
Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 36. See id. at 788 (incorporating parts of the Heller analysis).  
 37. See infra Part III (examining the lower courts’ decisions). 
 38. See infra Part IV (providing analysis connecting the Enforcement 
Clause with potential future legislation on the Second Amendment). 
 39. See infra Part IV (providing an analysis and concluding that the 
current jurisprudence is insufficient).  
 40. See Kimel v. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 85–86 (rejecting the 
Enforcement Clause argument for a statute that protected the equality rights of 
a non-suspect class). 
 41. See infra Part IV.B (detailing “four cases involving federal legislation 
defended as enforcing Fourteenth Amendment due process rights”). 
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enforcement statute as part of its congruence and proportionality 
review.42 That increased precision also allowed the Court to 
examine the legislative record to determine whether it reflected 
congressional findings revealing constitutional violations 
Congress had the authority to target.43 As Part IV explains, the 
relative lack of clarity in Second Amendment doctrine renders 
these approaches inapt in the Second Amendment context.44 
Part V offers a more granular approach to the enforcement 
power as applied to the Second Amendment.45 This approach 
requires courts evaluating enforcement legislation to parse the 
relevant underlying rights doctrine to determine the 
constitutional status of each component of that doctrine.46 It 
observes that some of those components reflect the Court’s 
fundamental understanding of what the Constitution requires, 
rather than decisional heuristics that suggest judicial 
underenforcement of the right and, accordingly, a larger role for 
                                                                                                     
 42. Cf. infra Part IV.B 
Applying this approach to the Second Amendment is helpful only to 
the extent that Second Amendment doctrine can be stated in a 
sufficiently clear and determinate way that it provides the same kind 
of clear reference point for congruence and proportionality analysis 
that the doctrinal test for judicial access rights provided in Lane. 
Unfortunately, Second Amendment doctrine is not that 
straightforward. 
(citations omitted). 
 43. See infra Part IV.B (“The Florida Prepaid Court also had the benefit of 
a relatively well-defined constitutional right, which allowed it to search the 
legislative record for examples.”). 
 44. See infra Part IV  
In contrast to the free exercise and property rights contexts in the 
Second Amendment context the Court has both identified a core 
version of the right, but also strongly hinted that more penumbral, 
and thus necessarily hazier, versions may exist as well. The vaguer 
nature of those latter rights makes it harder for a court considering 
Second Amendment enforcement legislation to examine Congress’s 
factual record to determine whether it reveals violations of ‘the 
constitutional right.  
(citations omitted). 
 45. See infra Part V (providing another approach to the Second 
Amendment issue).  
 46. See infra Part V (allowing “for a congressional role in vindicating 
Second Amendment rights to the extent Congress is institutionally relatively 
well-suited to contribute to particular components of courts’ doctrinal analysis”).  
1814 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) 
congressional enforcement.47 However, it also identifies 
components of the doctrine that partially rely on estimations of 
the empirical world, and which thus might be particularly 
amenable to congressional input.48 Those varied components of 
Second Amendment doctrine suggest a nuanced answer to the 
question of how much latitude Congress should enjoy when it 
seeks to enforce the Second Amendment right. 
Part VI concludes the Article by considering how the lessons 
learned from the Second Amendment example apply to the 
enforcement power more generally.49 It identifies several 
challenges the Court will likely confront in future Enforcement 
Clause cases, and explains how the approach laid out in this 
Article offers the best hope for meeting them.50  
II. The Enforcement Power Since Boerne 
A. Boerne 
The Court established its modern enforcement power 
doctrine in the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores.51 Boerne 
considered an Enforcement Clause challenge to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).52 Congress enacted RFRA in 
1993 in order to overturn the Court’s decision three years earlier 
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
                                                                                                     
 47. See infra Part V (considering Congress’s comparative institutional 
advantages over courts).  
 48. See infra Part V (explaining the varying levels of deference Congress 
ought to receive).  
 49. See infra Part VI (broadening the applicability of the Article’s 
approach).  
 50. See infra Part VI (explaining the need for a new approach to these 
cases).  
 51. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“[W]hether 
Congress has exceeded its § 5 powers turns on whether there is a ‘congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end.’”). 
 52. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 
and 5 U.S.C.). See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (analyzing whether RFRA exceeded 
the scope of Congress’s enforcement power). 
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Oregon v. Smith,53 which gave a narrow reading to the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.54 While ostensibly refraining 
from overruling any prior Free Exercise Clause cases, Smith 
announced a rule that markedly deviated from many of those 
earlier precedents by concluding that neutral and 
generally-applicable laws did not implicate the Free Exercise 
Clause.55 Thus, for example, while under pre-Smith 
jurisprudence the Court might have given careful scrutiny to a 
temperance law that had the effect of impairing Roman Catholic 
ritual consumption of wine, under the Smith rule such a law 
would not implicate the Free Exercise Clause as long as it was a 
religion-neutral regulation that applied to alcohol consumption 
generally. Following this approach, in Smith itself the Court 
found that an Oregon law disallowing unemployment benefits for 
workers fired for misconduct did not implicate the Free Exercise 
Clause, even though the law was applied to two Native American 
employees of a drug treatment facility who were dismissed for 
engaging in sacramental use of peyote.56 
Smith was highly unpopular across the political spectrum, 
and Congress enacted RFRA by huge bi-partisan margins.57 
                                                                                                     
 53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54. See id. at 882 (“Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when 
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only 
the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental 
regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion].”). 
 55. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently 
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).  
 56. See id. at 890 (“Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited 
under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, 
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment 
compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug.”). 
 57. See Donna Barry et al., Infographic: RFRA Repercussions, CTR. AM. 
PROGRESS (May 7, 2015, 2:24 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues 
/religion/news/2015/05/07/112783/infographic-rfra-repercussions/ (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2017) (“The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, 
passed in 1993 with broad bipartisan support and an aim to protect the right of 
Americans to freely believe and worship according to their consciences.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Boiled down, RFRA required that any state58 law or regulation 
that imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise be 
justified by a compelling interest that the law was narrowly 
tailored to accomplish.59 This standard, of course, imposes a very 
high hurdle. Even more significantly, that hurdle stands in direct 
opposition to Smith’s rule that only laws targeting religious 
practice implicate the Free Exercise Clause.60 In addition to the 
implicit challenge it posed to the Court’s supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation, RFRA also imposed significant 
federalism costs, given its imposition of a rule of conduct that 
applied regardless of the state’s intent to impair 
religion-motivated conduct, and, indeed, regardless even of 
whether the challenged action had a disparate impact on such 
conduct.61 For example, Boerne itself involved a city’s application 
of a generally-applicable historic district zoning rule to a church 
that wished to demolish its structure located in that district and 
build a larger, modern building.62 
In Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA’s Enforcement 
Clause foundation.63 Writing mostly64 for a six justice majority, 
                                                                                                     
 58. RFRA also applies to the federal government. That aspect of the statute 
does not implicate the Enforcement Clause, and thus was not at issue in Boerne, 
the case that struck down the law’s applicability to states. See Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 511 (analyzing only whether RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress’s 
enforcement power). 
 59. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 
107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 5 
U.S.C.). 
 60. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy noted in Boerne, RFRA’s requirement of 
narrow tailoring went even beyond the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence that 
Congress found constituted an appropriate accommodation of regulatory 
prerogatives and religious freedom. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
535 (1997) (noting that RFRA “imposes in every case a least restrictive means 
requirement—a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence 
RFRA purported to codify”). 
 61. See id. at 534 (“RFRA’s substantial-burden test, however, is not even a 
discriminatory effects or disparate-impact test. It is a reality of the modern 
regulatory state that numerous state laws, such as the zoning regulations at 
issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals.”). 
 62. For a comprehensive and detailed description of the controversy that 
gave rise to Boerne, see generally JEROLD WALTMAN, CONGRESS, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CASE OF BOERNE V. FLORES (2013). 
 63. RFRA’s applicability to the federal government was not an issue in 
Boerne. 
 64. See infra note 78 (providing information about the breakdown of the 
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Justice Kennedy recognized that the Enforcement Clause gave 
Congress the power to enact legislation that did more than 
simply prescribe remedies for court-found constitutional 
violations.65 Nevertheless, he wrote that legislation enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment66 had to be “congruen[t] and 
proportion[al]” to the underlying constitutional violation the 
legislation sought to deter.67 Applying that standard to RFRA, he 
found that the law “far exceed[ed]”68 any constitutional violations 
that Congress had uncovered in its hearings on RFRA. 
Identifying the relevant underlying constitutional violation as 
laws enacted out of “religious bigotry,”69 he observed that those 
hearings had failed to uncover evidence of such conduct on the 
part of states.70  
Continuing, he characterized RFRA as an unusually harsh 
and wide-ranging law.71 Unlike the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
whose constitutionality as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth 
                                                                                                     
justices’ views in the opinions). 
 65. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517–18 (reestablishing the Court’s stance that 
Congress’s power is broad).  
 66. The Court has been ambiguous about whether the standard it 
announced in Boerne applies as well to legislation enforcing the other 
Reconstruction Amendments, or other constitutional amendments that provide 
similarly-worded enforcement authority to Congress. See generally Shelby Cty. 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (failing to state whether the standard it 
announced in Boerne applies as well to legislation enforcing the other 
Reconstruction Amendments, or other constitutional amendments that provide 
similarly-worded enforcement authority to Congress). 
 67. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.”). 
 68. See id. at 534 (“The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical 
terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of 
curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as 
interpreted in Smith.”). 
 69. See id. at 530 (reviewing RFRA’s legislative record to determine if it 
included examples of “modern instances of generally applicable laws passed 
because of religious bigotry”). 
 70. See id. at 535 (“In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are 
not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry.”).  
 71. See id. at 532 (The Act’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at 
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of 
almost every description and regardless of subject matter”).  
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Amendment had been established three decades before,72 Justice 
Kennedy observed that RFRA lacked any geographical limitation 
or sunset provision.73 As noted earlier, nor did it require a 
disparate impact on the protected group or conduct as a trigger.74 
Again as noted above, he observed that not only was strict 
scrutiny “the most demanding test known to constitutional 
law,”75 but that that standard went beyond the showing required 
by the Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise jurisprudence.76 For these 
reasons, he concluded that RFRA was not congruent and 
proportional to the free exercise right it was ostensibly designed 
to enforce.77 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis commanded impressive support 
across the Court’s ideological spectrum. Five justices spanning 
that spectrum from Justices Thomas to Ginsburg joined his 
opinion in relevant part.78 Of the remaining three justices, 
Justice O’Connor explicitly endorsed the Court’s Enforcement 
Clause analysis, expressing disagreement only with the Court’s 
understanding of the underlying free exercise right,79 Justice 
                                                                                                     
 72. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (holding 
that the relevant “portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a 
valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment”). A 
particular Voting Rights Act provision dealing with English literacy tests, as 
applied to citizens educated in Spanish, was upheld as legislation enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) 
(“We therefore conclude that [§] 4(e), in the application challenged in this case, 
is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
 73. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 511, 533 (1997) (noting that 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require geographic 
restrictions but “[w]here . . . congressional enactment pervasively prohibits 
constitutional state action . . . [geographical] limitations . . . tend to ensure 
Congress’[s] means are proportionate”). 
 74. See id. at 535 (noting that the test for RFRA is the substantial burdens 
test, not the disparate-impact test). 
 75. See id. at 534 (“Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest 
and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.”). 
 76. See id. at 535 (“Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without 
regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise.”). 
 77. See id. at 536 (concluding that “RFRA contradicts vital principles 
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance”). 
 78. See id. at 509 (including Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg as well as Justice Scalia, who did not join Kennedy’s historical 
analysis).  
 79. See id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)  
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Breyer joined most of Justice O’Connor’s opinion and indicated 
his general (though not complete) agreement with her approval of 
the Court’s Enforcement Clause analysis,80 and Justice Souter 
did not express a view on the Enforcement Clause issue.81 Thus, 
no justice affirmatively disagreed with the congruence and 
proportionality standard, and at least seven, and possibly eight, 
justices embraced it.82 
1. The Enforcement Power in Its First Post-Boerne Decade 
After Boerne, most of the Court’s encounters with the 
enforcement power involved legislation defended as enforcing the 
equal protection rights of particular groups against 
unconstitutional discrimination.83 However, the Court’s first 
post-Boerne encounter with the enforcement power considered a 
law defended as legislation enforcing the right to be free of 
property infringements without due process of law. In Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank,84 the Court struck down, as exceeding the 
                                                                                                     
[I]f I agreed with the Court’s standard in Smith, I would join 
the [majority] opinion. As the Court’s careful and thorough 
historical analysis shows, Congress lacks the power to decree 
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on 
the States. . . . Accordingly, whether Congress has exceeded its 
§ 5 powers turns on whether there is a “congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.  
(internal quotes and citation omitted). 
 80. See id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing vague agreement with 
most of O’Connor’s approval of the majority’s Enforcement Clause analysis). 
 81. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the inability of the 
majority to soundly decide the Enforcement Clause question). 
 82. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text (outlining the Justices’ 
opinions and arguments).  
 83. See generally Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 
(2012) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting sex discrimination); Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting disability 
discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (reviewing an 
enforcement statute targeting age discrimination); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting sex 
discrimination). 
 84. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
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enforcement power, an amendment to federal patent laws that 
abrogated state sovereign immunity from patent infringement 
lawsuits.85 Writing for the same five-justice majority that had 
generated the Court’s federalism revolution of the 1990s,86 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the law failed Boerne’s 
congruence and proportionality test because, as with RFRA, 
Congress had failed to demonstrate a pattern of state violations 
of the underlying right.87 He also noted the availability of state 
tort remedies for at least some of these violations; based on this 
latter conclusion, he questioned whether states were in fact 
depriving patent holders of their property without due process.88  
Justice Stevens, dissenting for the similarly-durable 
four-justice bloc opposing the majority bloc’s federalism 
jurisprudence,89 argued that the enforcement statute satisfied 
Boerne’s congruence and proportionality standard.90 He argued 
                                                                                                     
 85. See id. at 647 (“The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore 
make it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 86. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking 
down a federal law as exceeding Congress’s power under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
(holding that Congress lacked the power to use its power to regulate interstate 
commerce or commerce with Indian tribes to make non-consenting states liable 
for retrospective relief); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 
(1997) (vindicating a claim of state sovereign immunity despite the prospective 
nature of the relief requested); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(holding that Congress lacked the power to commandeer state law 
enforcements); Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (rejecting a claim that a state had waived its sovereign 
immunity by participating in federally-regulated activity). Another federalism 
case from that decade, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), was 
decided by this same five-justice majority, joined by Justice Souter, who would 
defect from this coalition in the remaining federalism cases of the decade. See 
New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (holding that Congress lacked the power to 
commandeer state legislatures).  
 87. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (“In enacting the Patent Remedy 
Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the 
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”). 
 88. See id. at 644 (“The primary point made by these witnesses, however, 
was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that 
they were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the 
uniformity of patent law.”). 
 89. See supra note 86 (identifying cases of new federalism jurisprudence). 
 90. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that the Boerne decision “amply supports congressional authority to enact the 
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that Congress did in fact have in front of it evidence of past state 
constitutional violations—intentional deprivations of patent 
rights.91 Foreshadowing arguments that would be made in other 
opinions urging the upholding of enforcement legislation, he also 
argued that Congress was aware of the likelihood that states 
would increasingly violate property rights in patents.92 He 
further argued that the protection of such rights provided a 
legitimate reason for Congress to insist on a uniform application 
of patent laws, via patent litigation in federal court, rather than 
commending victims of alleged state government infringement to 
state law tort remedies in the state’s own courts.93 
In retrospect, Florida Prepaid can be seen as the harbinger of 
the justices’ attitudes toward enforcement legislation. A thin 
majority would insist on stringent application of the congruence 
and proportionality test, including an insistence on facts 
demonstrating an actual record of state conduct that judicial 
doctrine deems unconstitutional. The dissenters, by contrast, 
would allow Congress more latitude in detecting the potentiality 
of constitutional violations by state actors. 
After Florida Prepaid, the Court’s Enforcement Clause 
jurisprudence shifted focus, toward legislation defended as 
enforcing equal protection rights. In a series of cases—United 
States v. Morrison,94 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,95 Board 
                                                                                                     
Patent Remedy Act”).  
 91. Justice Stevens hedged on the question of whether such deprivations 
had to be intentional in order to violate the Constitution; nevertheless, he 
argued that, assuming that intent was required, that requirement was met in 
Florida Prepaid because the victim of the alleged state infringement conduct 
alleged that that conduct was willful. See id. at 653–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Respondent College Savings Bank has alleged that petitioner’s infringement 
was willful. The question presented by this case, then, is whether the Patent 
Remedy Act, which clarified Congress’[s] intent to subject state infringers to suit 
in federal court, may be applied to willful infringement.”). 
 92. See id. at 656–57 (providing a list of cases in which states and their 
instrumentalities have been involved in patent cases). 
 93. See id. at 659 (“Even if such remedies might be available in theory, it 
would have been ‘appropriate’ for Congress to conclude that they would not 
guarantee patentees due process in infringement actions against state 
defendants.”).  
 94. See 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (affirming the appellate ruling that 
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the civil remedy under 42 
U.S.C. § 13981).  
 95. See 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (concluding that the “ADEA does contain a 
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of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,96 and Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,97 the Court considered 
whether provisions of, respectively, the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) were supportable as enforcement 
legislation.98 In each of these cases, the Court’s analysis focused 
on whether the statutory provision at issue was “appropriate” 
legislation enforcing the equal protection rights of the group the 
given statute benefitted—women in case of VAWA and the 
FMLA, elderly persons in the case of the ADEA, and disabled 
persons in the case of the ADA.99 
The first of these cases, Morrison, can be dealt with quickly. 
The Court in that case relied heavily on the fact that the VAWA 
provision at issue regulated private parties by making a 
perpetrator of gender-motivated violence liable to a federal law 
cause of action brought by his victim.100 Even though this 
                                                                                                     
clear statement of Congress’[s] intent to abrogate the States’ immunity, but that 
the abrogation exceeded Congress’[s] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”).  
 96. See 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (deciding “whether employees of the State 
of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State’s failure to 
comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990”). 
 97. See 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (finding that “employees of the State of 
Nevada may recover money damages in the event of the State’s failure to comply 
with the family-care provision of the” FMLA). 
 98. Except for VAWA, the Commerce Clause bona fides of these statutes 
were unquestioned, a conclusion that also allowed their application to states. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Agency, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) 
(upholding under the Commerce Clause legislation that imposed regulatory 
duties on states acting as economic actors). However, in Seminole Tribe, the 
Court found that retrospective relief against state government violators, ordered 
at the behest of private litigants, exceeded Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996) 
(holding that Congress lacked the power to make retrospective relief, such as 
damages, available against non-consenting states). That holding left the 
Enforcement Clause as the only viable constitutional foundation for such 
remedies. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 94–97 (citing cases where the Court’s Enforcement 
Clause jurisprudence shifted focus, toward legislation defended as enforcing 
equal protection rights).  
 100. See Morrison, 529 U.S at 604 (describing the procedural posture of 
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University). 
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provision was defended on the ground that state and local law 
enforcement often under-investigated and under-enforced 
gender-motivated violence, Morrison rejected its Enforcement 
Clause foundation101 because the law regulated private parties 
rather than state actors.102  
Kimel is the first of these cases that involved a statute 
explicitly regulating states and thus actually requiring in-depth 
consideration of the congruence and proportionality standard.103 
While Kimel’s application of that standard is relatively brief, it 
nevertheless created the template for future Enforcement Clause 
cases involving equality-enforcing legislation. In Kimel, Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the same five-justice majority as that in 
Morrison and Florida Prepaid, began by observing that age was 
not a suspect classification under the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.104 For the majority, that conclusion in turn 
justified skeptical review of the ADEA’s congruence and 
proportionality to what it had concluded was the trivial 
constitutional problem posed by age discrimination.105 That 
review led Justice O’Connor to conclude that the ADEA 
                                                                                                     
 101. See id. at 627 (concluding that Congress’s “power under § 5 does not 
extend to the enactment of § 13981”). The same justices that rejected the 
provision’s Enforcement Clause foundation also held the provision to exceed 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. See id. (“Congress’[s] effort in 
§ 13981 to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the 
Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 102. The Court reasoned that this private-party remedy against other 
private parties rendered the provision per se inappropriate enforcement 
legislation, based on early Enforcement Clause precedent, and also meant that 
the law failed Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test. See id. at 621–25 
(stating precedent); id. at 625–27 (performing congruence and proportionality 
analysis). The Court also quickly noted at the end of its analysis that the VAWA 
provision also failed congruence and proportionality because it applied 
throughout the nation, even though Congress had documented the problem of 
official neglect of gender-motivated crimes in fewer than half the states. See id. 
at 626 (“Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of discrimination 
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or 
even most States.”). 
 103. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81–82 (2000) 
(highlighting the congruence and proportionality standard). But see supra note 
102 (noting Morrison’s congruence and proportionality analysis).  
 104. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“Age . . . does not define a discrete and 
insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will 
experience it.”). 
 105. See id. at 82–83 (performing such skeptical review). 
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prevented very little conduct that was likely to be 
unconstitutional.106  
To be sure, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the 
Enforcement Clause authorized Congress to enact “reasonably 
prophylactic legislation”—that is, legislation that prohibited 
conduct that did not in itself violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.107 That concession required her to examine 
Congress’s legislative record, to determine whether Congress had 
identified a pattern of state constitutional violations in this area 
that justified a prophylactic deterrent.108 She concluded that that 
record revealed only “isolated sentences clipped from floor 
debates and legislative reports,” an evaluation that led her to 
conclude that the ADEA’s application to states was “an 
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.”109  
The next case, Garrett, posed a more difficult question for the 
Court. Garrett involved an enforcement power challenge to the 
employment provisions of the ADA.110 Two factors made Garrett a 
harder case than Kimel. First, unlike the ADEA, the ADA 
featured a voluminous legislative record, which identified a long 
list of instances of state discrimination against disabled 
employees.111 Second, the Court’s disability discrimination 
jurisprudence was more nuanced than its age discrimination 
counterpart.112 Most importantly, in 1985, in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center,113 the Court had concluded that a city’s 
                                                                                                     
 106. See id. at 86 (stating the ADEA would “prohibit[] substantially more 
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held 
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis 
standard”). 
 107. See id. at 88 (“[W]e have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from 
enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation.”). 
 108. See id. at 89 (“Congress never identified any pattern of age 
discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose 
to the level of constitutional violation.”).  
 109.  Id. at 89.  
 110. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) 
(“We decide here whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money 
damages by reason of the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of Title I 
of the [ADA] . . . .”).  
 111. See id. at 368 (noting the legislative record). 
 112. See infra notes 113–117 (discussing the analytical differences between 
age discrimination and disability discrimination cases).  
 113. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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discrimination against intellectually disabled persons violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because it was based on “irrational 
prejudice.”114 That conclusion confounded the normal equal 
protection template, in which discrimination against non-suspect 
classes—including the disabled—normally triggered the most 
deferential rational basis review that almost necessarily resulted 
in a rejection of the equal protection claim.115 Indeed, in contrast 
to Cleburne’s analysis of disability discrimination, the Court’s age 
discrimination jurisprudence in Garrett followed exactly the 
normal equal protection template.116 Together, these two factors 
painted a picture in which the ADA’s employment provisions 
targeted discrimination that at least potentially raised a more 
serious constitutional problem, and which Congress had 
identified as occurring frequently. 117 
Despite these differences, in Garrett the Court adhered 
closely to the template it had created a year before in Kimel. 
Writing for the same five-justice majority as that in Florida 
Prepaid, Morrison, and Kimel, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by 
dismissing the idea that Cleburne suggested that disability 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 450 (requiring the permit in this case “to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the 
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly 
regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law”).  
 115. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (“The State need 
therefore assert only a rational basis for its age classification.”); Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979) (“Because Congress desired to maintain the 
competence of the Foreign Service, the mandatory retirement age of 60 
rationally furthers its legitimate objective . . . .”); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (stating that rational basis is “a relatively 
relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that 
create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one”). 
 116. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“A classification cannot run afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity 
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” (quoting Heller v. 
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (applying traditionally deferential rational basis 
scrutiny to a disability classification))); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470 (applying the 
same equal protection analysis); Vance, 440 U.S. at 108–09 (same); Murgia, 427 
U.S. at 314 (same).  
 117. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“Congress made a general finding in the 
ADA that ‘historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals 
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive 
social problem.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2002))). 
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discrimination merited special judicial scrutiny.118 Instead, he 
described Cleburne as applying “minimum ‘rational basis’ 
review”119 to strike down a government action that simply “made 
no sense.”120 He then proceeded to minimize the force of 
Congress’s factual record documenting state government 
employment discrimination against the disabled.121 Among other 
things, he dismissed as irrelevant examples from local 
governments122 and insisted that any remaining examples would 
only be relevant if they revealed discrimination that would have 
been adjudged unconstitutional had they been litigated in a 
court.123 More broadly, he rejected the relevance of Congress’s 
finding that, as a general matter, society continued to isolate and 
discriminate against disabled persons.124 With Congress’s record 
cut down to size, and the significance of the underlying 
constitutional violation minimized, the way was clear for the 
Chief Justice to conclude, as Justice O’Connor had in Kimel, that 
the ADA was a disproportionate response to what the Court 
declared to be an insignificant constitutional problem.125 
In the next case, Hibbs, the Court continued to ground its 
Enforcement Clause analysis on the suspect class status of the 
group the challenged enforcement legislation sought to protect.126 
Hibbs considered the family-care leave provision of the FMLA—a 
provision that gave workers uncompensated time off from work to 
                                                                                                     
 118. See id. at 367–68 (2001) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not require states to make accommodations for the disabled if the state has a 
rational basis for its decision). 
 119. Id. at 366 
 120. Id. at 366 n.4. 
 121. See id. at 369–72 (revealing the Court’s general dismissal of Congress’s 
record).  
 122. See id. at 369 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend its 
immunity to units of local government.”).  
 123. See id. at 370 (observing that constitutional violations will rarely arise 
from adverse and disparate treatment). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
emphasized this point in particular. See id. at 374–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(stating that no judicial documentation of constitutional violations exists). 
 124. See id. at 369–70 (majority opinion) (noting that adverse and disparate 
treatment generally do not amount to a constitutional violation). 
 125. See id. at 374 (“[T]o uphold the Act’s application to the States would 
allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this 
Court in Cleburne.”). 
 126. See generally Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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care for sick relatives.127 In a departure from the Court’s 
application of the congruence and proportionality analysis up to 
that point, the Court upheld this provision of the FMLA as valid 
enforcement legislation protecting women’s equal protection 
rights.128 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for himself and 
Justice O’Connor and the four justices who had dissented in the 
earlier post-Boerne cases, began his analysis by recognizing that 
sex classifications merited heightened judicial scrutiny.129 That 
fact gave him the latitude to credit the type of legislative record 
evidence that he had found inadequate two years earlier in 
Garrett.130 
After according generous review to the evidence supporting 
the FMLA’s enforcement power bona fides, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist then distinguished Kimel and Garrett. He did so 
expressly on the ground of the different levels of constitutional 
protection accorded sex discrimination as compared with either 
disability or age discrimination.131 He wrote the following 
immediately after concluding that “[i]n sum, the States’ record of 
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based 
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty 
enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation:”132 
We reached the opposite conclusion in Garrett and Kimel. In 
those cases, the § 5 legislation under review responded to a 
purported tendency of state officials to make age- or 
                                                                                                     
 127. See id. at 724 (“[It] entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work 
weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of several reasons, including the onset of 
a ‘serious health condition’ in an employee’s spouse, child, or parent.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 128. As the Court explained, the family-care leave provision aimed at 
ensuring that women were not penalized for taking time off work to care for sick 
relatives, by granting all employees a right to take such leave. See id. at 736–37 
(discussing these aims of the provision). 
 129. See id. at 730 (“The long and extensive history of sex discrimination 
prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender 
warrant heightened scrutiny . . . .”). 
 130. See id. (relying on evidence of private-sector discrimination). But see id. 
at 730 n.3 (noting evidence stating, in general terms, that state government 
conduct in this area “differs little” from that of private sector actors). 
 131. See id. at 735–36 (stating that discrimination based on age or disability 
is not evaluated under the heightened standard for sexual discrimination, but 
rather utilizes a rational basis standard). 
 132. Id. at 735. 
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disability-based distinctions. Under our equal protection case 
law, discrimination on the basis of such characteristics is not 
judged under a heightened review standard, and passes 
muster if there is a rational basis for doing so at a class-based 
level . . . . Thus, in order to impugn the constitutionality of 
state discrimination against the disabled or the elderly, 
Congress must identify, not just the existence of age- or 
disability-based state decisions, but a widespread pattern of 
irrational reliance on such criteria. We found no such showing 
with respect to the ADEA and Title I of the [ADA]. 
Here, however, Congress directed its attention to state gender 
discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. 
Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality 
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than 
our rational-basis test—it must “serve important 
governmental objectives” and be “substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives”—it was easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.133 
Thus, in all three of these cases, the Court’s identification of the 
suspect class status of the benefitted group was foundational to 
its enforcement power analysis.134 The significance of this fact 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 735–36 (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted). 
 134. See, e.g., Y. Frank Ren, Fixing Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement 
Power: An Argument for a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Congressional 
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2013) 
(noting the importance to the Court’s enforcement power analysis of the scrutiny 
level accorded to direct constitutional claims involving the right protected by the 
enforcement legislation); see also id. at 1469 (“In many [enforcement power 
cases invalidating the enforcement legislation] the Court emphasized how 
important the levels of scrutiny were in its congruence and proportionality 
analysis.”); id. at 1471 (“Boerne and its progeny clarified that Congress’s 
authority to pass legislation under its enforcement power is not limitless, but 
rather restricted based on the importance of the right that Congress intended to 
protect.”); Gillian Egan, Unreasonable Requirements for Reasonable 
Enforcement: “Congruence and Proportionality” After Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 29, 38 (2013) (“In reviewing whether 
legislation meets [the requirements of congruence and proportionality], the 
court applies the level of scrutiny such a classification usually receives in Equal 
Protection cases, whether it be rational, intermediate, strict, or some other 
standard.”); Massey, supra note 8, at 2  
The distilled product of [the post-Boerne Enforcement Clause] cases is 
the notion that judicial deference to Congress concerning the proper 
scope of such preventive measures varies in rough proportion to the 
level of judicial scrutiny the Court invokes to test the validity of state 
actions that allegedly violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See also Even Tsen Lee, The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for 
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goes beyond the (perhaps unsurprising) insight that congruence 
and proportionality review relies heavily on the constitutional 
status of the problem the enforcement legislation targets.135 In 
the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, what mattered to the Court was 
not so much that constitutional status of simpliciter, but rather, 
that status as translated into a judicially-workable doctrine via 
the tiered scrutiny framework.136 That framework, which rests 
ultimately on the political process-based reasoning derived from 
the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,137 assigns to different classifications different levels of 
judicial scrutiny depending on the Court’s perception of the 
burdened group’s ability to protect itself in the majoritarian 
political process.138 Most notably, the lowest-tier standard of 
review, rational basis, rests on a presumption that groups 
assigned that standard can protect themselves in the political 
process and thus do not need extraordinary judicial protection.139 
Thus, the tiers of scrutiny are decisional heuristics rather than 
expressions of core constitutional principle. As explained later,140 
                                                                                                     
the Fifteenth Amendment as Well, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 483, 502 (2012) 
(approving of this approach).  
 135. See Ren, supra note 134, at 1469 (noting how carefully Enforcement 
Clause doctrine in these cases focused the Court’s congruence and 
proportionality analysis on the level of scrutiny triggered by the type of 
discrimination targeted by the challenged enforcement legislation). 
 136. See id. (“In . . . these cases, the Court emphasized how important the 
levels of scrutiny were in its congruence and proportionality analysis.”).  
 137. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 138. See id. at 152 n.4 (discussing “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities” and its impact on the political process, and the resultant need for 
more careful judicial review when such prejudice was found to exist). 
 139. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96–97 (1979) 
Appellees have not suggested that the [challenged] statutory 
distinction . . . burdens a suspect group or a fundamental interest; 
and in cases where these considerations are absent, courts are quite 
reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it 
denies equal protection of the laws. The Constitution presumes that, 
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions 
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we 
may think a political branch has acted. 
 140. See infra notes 219–232 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
continued silence on the standard of review). 
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this fact further complicates congruence and proportionality 
review. 
The Court’s next Enforcement Clause case, Tennessee v. 
Lane,141 marked the effective end of the Court’s first decade of 
applying Boerne.142 Lane differed from the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs 
trilogy because it chose to test, and ultimately uphold, the 
application of the enforcement statute in question on due process 
rather than equal protection grounds.143 Nevertheless, Lane 
reinforced the basic idea developed in that trilogy—that the fate 
of an enforcement statute would turn on whether it enforced a 
right judicial doctrine treated as constitutionally significant. 
Lane dealt with the public services provisions of the ADA—that 
is, those provisions that guaranteed access to “the services, 
programs or activities of a public entity.”144 It involved a lawsuit 
by two physically disabled persons—a court reporter and a 
defendant in a criminal case—who were unable to access the 
upper floors of a state courthouse.145 When they sued the state, it 
pleaded sovereign immunity, and alleged that the public services 
provision exceeded Congress’s power under the Enforcement 
Clause.146 
Writing for a five-justice majority (the justices in the Hibbs 
majority minus Chief Justice Rehnquist),147 Justice Stevens 
began by acknowledging that the Court could analyze the statute 
as either enforcing the equal protection rights of disabled persons 
                                                                                                     
 141. See 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004) (deciding “whether Title II exceeds 
Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 142. To be sure, the Court did decide one final case in the decade after 
Boerne. See generally United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (ruling in 
2006, nine years after Boerne was decided in 1997). Georgia is discussed at infra 
note 153 (explaining that case as involving legislation enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment as applied to conduct that, if proven, was conceded to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment) and at infra note 281.  
 143. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 515 (upholding the application of the ADA 
challenged in that case as legislation enforcing the Due Process Clause). 
 144. Id. at 509 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)). 
 145. See id. at 513–14 (stating that the defendant crawled up two flights of 
steps and the court reporter was deprived of work opportunities). 
 146. See id. at 514 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking 
money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA.”). 
 147. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the principal dissent for himself and 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Scalia dissented separately. 
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or the due process right to access the judicial process.148 
Concluding that a ruling focused on the latter right would be 
narrower, Justice Stevens chose to consider whether the public 
services provision was a congruent and proportional enforcement 
of the constitutional right to courthouse access.149 Regardless of 
the reason,150 his decision to narrow the focus of his analysis 
allowed him to conclude that the public services provision was 
indeed “congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the 
right of access to the courts.”151 He argued that the ADA’s 
standard—that public services provide “reasonable modifications” 
to their programs to allow disabled access—was “perfectly 
consistent” with the Court’s constitutional standard for access to 
the judicial process: That “within the limits of practicability, a 
State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard in its courts.”152 Thus, in Lane, the scope of the 
underlying right played a crucial role in the congruence and 
proportionality analysis, just as it had in the three preceding 
enforcement power cases.153 
                                                                                                     
 148. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 514–15 (recognizing that there were two ways to 
analyze the statute). 
 149. See id. at 522–23 (noting that these provisions of the ADA guaranteed 
against both irrationality disability discrimination and “a variety of other basic 
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching 
judicial review”). 
 150. Presumably, this choice was also influenced by his desire to avoid the 
implications of Garrett, which had frowned upon enforcement legislation aimed 
generally at the equal protection rights of disabled persons. 
 151. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). 
 152. Id. at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. The final case of Boerne’s first decade was Georgia. In Georgia, a 
unanimous Court held that a federal law was valid Enforcement Clause 
legislation to the extent it simply creates a private cause of action for conduct 
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment itself. United States v. Georgia, 546 
U.S. 151, 159 (2006). Georgia dealt with the ADA’s public services provision—
the same provision at issue in Lane—as applied to a state prison’s alleged denial 
of a number of services to a disabled inmate. Id. at 154–55. Most importantly, 
the inmate-plaintiff alleged, and the state-defendant conceded, that the state’s 
conduct, if proven, would violate both the ADA and the Eighth Amendment (and 
hence the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth). Id. at 157. 
Thus, Georgia posed the straightforward question of whether the ADA’s 
provision of money damages for violations of the public services provision 
constituted appropriate enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause when applied to conduct that was alleged actually to violate the 
Due Process Clause. So understood, it should come as no surprise that the Court 
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B. The Enforcement Power Today 
Since Lane, the Supreme Court has decided two significant 
cases considering the breadth of the enforcement power.154 Both 
of them have called into the question the Court’s post-Boerne 
approach. 
The first of these cases returned to the question of the 
constitutionality of prophylactic enforcement legislation,155 but 
adopted an analysis that raised questions about the durability of 
the template created by the prophylactic legislation cases 
discussed above. In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,156 
the Court considered the personal-care leave provision of the 
FMLA—the same statute whose family-care leave provision was 
upheld in Hibbs.157 Both the personal and family-care leave 
provisions were defended as measures enforcing the equal 
protection right to sex equality.158 As noted earlier, much of the 
defense for the family-care leave provision centered on the 
argument that stereotypical views about women’s primary 
                                                                                                     
unanimously upheld this application of the ADA’s public services provision. As 
Justice Scalia explained in writing the opinion for the Court:  
While the Members of th[e] Court have disagreed regarding the scope 
of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement powers under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the 
power to “enforce . . . the provisions” of the Amendment by creating 
private remedies against the States for actual violations of those 
provisions.  
Id. at 158 (citations omitted). But just as Georgia states an unremarkable 
proposition of Enforcement Clause doctrine, it adds little to the far more 
nuanced issues discussed in other post-Boerne cases. 
 154. To repeat a point made earlier, a third case, Georgia, posed a more 
straightforward enforcement power question that did not cause controversy 
among the justices. See supra note 153 (discussing Georgia); infra note 155 and 
accompanying text (same). 
 155. Cf. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158 (noting the disagreement among the 
justices about the constitutionality of enforcement legislation that is 
prophylactic in nature). 
 156. 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 157. See id. at 33 (“The statute in question is the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993 . . . .”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) 
(finding that “employees of the State of Nevada may recover money damages in 
the event of the State’s failure to comply with the family-care provision” of the 
FMLA). 
 158. See Coleman, 566 US. at 42 (noting the defense in detail). 
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responsibility for domestic affairs (including caretaking) led 
employers to disfavor women as employees. 159 
The personal-care leave provision was defended on similar, 
but distinct grounds. In addition to arguing that that provision 
ensured sex equality by prohibiting pregnancy discrimination (an 
argument the Court rejected for other reasons160), defenders of 
the personal-care leave provision also insisted that it served as a 
“necessary adjunct to the family-care leave provision sustained in 
Hibbs.”161 The argument was that the family-care leave provision, 
while intended to promote sex equality, would have had the 
perverse effect of encouraging sex discrimination if enacted as a 
standalone provision.162 The theory was that providing family 
care leave, when coupled with lingering perceptions that family 
care was a woman’s job, made women even less desirable as 
employees.163 On this theory, women would still 
disproportionately ask for such leave (or would be perceived as 
doing so)—but now, with the family-care leave provision in place, 
they would have a right to it. According to its defenders, the 
personal-care leave provision stepped in to equalize either the 
reality or least the perception of the burdens male and female 
workers would place on employers via FMLA leave.164 With both 
men and women asking for personal care leave, defenders argued, 
FMLA leave in general would come to be seen less as a woman’s 
right and more as an employee’s right, which in turn would tend 
to equalize men’s and women’s desirability as employees.165 
                                                                                                     
 159. See supra note 128 (discussing the aim of the family-care leave 
provision). 
 160. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39 (rejecting the argument that the provision 
addressed any pregnancy-related discrimination in which states might be 
engaging). 
 161. Id. at 37. 
 162. See id. at 39 (noting the plaintiff’s argument that “[w]hen the self-care 
provision is coupled with the family-care provisions, the self-care provision could 
reduce the difference in the expected number of weeks of FMLA leave that 
different employees take”). 
 163. See id. at 45, 60–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining this 
argument). 
 164. See id. at 39 (stating the plaintiff’s argument that men would be 
encouraged to take more time off while women continue to take the same 
amount). 
 165. See id. (noting the plaintiff’s argument that increased leave for both 
sexes would reduce the number of people viewing it as strictly a women’s right).  
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A four-justice plurality, speaking through Justice Kennedy, 
rejected this analysis.166 He characterized the argument 
recounted above as “overly complicated” and “unconvincing,”167 
concluded that it lacked support in the legislative record, and 
argued that it created an internal contradiction to the extent 
advocates also argued that the self-care leave provision helped 
women because women took more personal care leave time than 
men.168 
But what Justice Kennedy said is less important than what 
he did not say. At no point did Justice Kennedy cite Hibbs’s 
language about sex equality meriting heightened judicial 
protection, and Hibbs’s follow-on conclusion that therefore “it was 
easier”169 for Congress to justify legislation enforcing that right. 
Instead, what he expressed was impatience and skepticism about 
whether the personal-care leave provision did in fact effectively 
enforce that right—sentiments that at the very least stand in 
some tension with the “easier” congressional task described in 
Hibbs.170 
It is difficult to know whether Coleman portends a new era of 
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, or is simply a one-off case 
                                                                                                     
 166. Justice Scalia provided the fifth vote, but he refused to join the 
plurality’s analysis as he had previously renounced his agreement with the 
congruence and proportionality standard in favor of an even more stringent 
standard for judging enforcement legislation. Id. at 44–45 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 167. See id. at 40 (plurality opinion) (“Petitioner’s overly complicated 
argument about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the 
family-care provisions is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the 
clear requirements of City of Boerne.”). 
 168. See id. at 40 (“But if the first defense is correct, the second defense is 
wrong. In other words, if employers assume women take self-care leave more 
often than men (the first defense), a self-care provision will not provide an 
incentive to hire women.”). 
 169. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) 
(“Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-
based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it 
was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”).  
 170. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Segal, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Protection After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 461 
(2000) (“If the exercise of congressional Section 5 power [had to] be congruent 
and proportional to behavior that a court would hold unconstitutional under 
rational basis review, virtually all antidiscrimination legislation, except that 
protecting racial minorities and women, [would] be rendered beyond Congress’s 
Section 5 power[s].”). 
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dealing with an enforcement statute that was perhaps unusually 
poorly justified.171 A subsequent case, however, does suggest that 
Coleman may in fact presage evolution in Enforcement Clause 
doctrine. In Shelby County v. Holder,172 the Court struck down 
the coverage formula governing the preclearance provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA).173 That result effectively invalidated the 
preclearance provisions themselves, a crucial component of the 
VRA. 
Shelby County’s significance for the enforcement power is 
unclear, given the Court’s ambiguity about the doctrinal standard 
it was applying.174 But despite that ambiguity, its analysis at 
least raises the possibility that Coleman may not be a one-off in 
its focus on the effectiveness of the statute in enforcing the 
constitutional right at issue. Just as in Coleman, in Shelby 
                                                                                                     
 171. This weakness may be traced to the fact that, at base, Congress was 
likely targeting pregnancy discrimination with the personal care leave 
provision. The Court rejected this justification because of insufficient findings of 
such discrimination by the states—but also perhaps, as Justice Ginsburg noted 
in her dissent, because the Court refused to accept the proposition that 
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. See Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 54–55 (2012) (plurality opinion) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing precedent that distinguished discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy from discrimination on the basis of sex, but noting that “this case 
is a fit occasion to revisit that conclusion”). 
 172. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 173. The Court suggested that it was reviewing those provisions as a 
measure designed to enforce both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth 
Amendments, and referred to an earlier opinion construing the VRA as 
“guiding” the Court’s review. See id. at 2622 n.1 (noting that the decision in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder “guides our 
review under both Amendments in this case”). However, that earlier opinion 
said essentially nothing about the standard of review—a silence that was 
repeated in Shelby County itself. See generally Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 
2612. On its own merits, this raises the important question of whether Boerne’s 
congruence and proportionality standard applies to legislation enforcing the 
Fifteenth Amendment (and, by implication, legislation enforcing the Thirteenth, 
and perhaps legislation adopted pursuant to similarly-worded enforcement 
clauses in other constitutional amendments). Cf. Derek Muller, Judicial Review 
of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 303–06 (2013) (discussing the possible reasons for the 
Court’s refusal to settle this question in Shelby County). For our more limited 
purposes, Shelby County introduces new considerations into the analysis of 
legislation enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights, as noted in the text 
following this note. See generally Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 174. See supra note 173 (noting this ambiguity). 
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County the Court faulted the fit between the enforcement statute 
and the constitutional right it sought to vindicate.175 According to 
the Court, the problem with the VRA was that the preclearance 
provisions’ coverage formula, unchanged in over fifty years, no 
longer reflected contemporary realities about minority political 
participation in the covered jurisdictions.176 Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the five-justice majority, cited evidence of 
minority voter registration and turnout in those jurisdictions to 
conclude that those areas no longer exhibited unusually high 
levels of minority voter exclusion as compared with non-covered 
jurisdictions.177  
One can disagree with that conclusion—indeed, the 
dissenters did so, vociferously,178 as have many scholars.179 For 
our purposes, however, the important point is that the Court 
tested enforcement legislation and found it wanting, but not 
because, as in Kimel or Garrett, it attacked a 
constitutionally-insignificant problem. Such a rationale would 
have been utterly implausible, given the centrality of racial 
equality to the Fourteenth Amendment and the very 
subject-matter of the Fifteenth Amendment—racial equality in 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625–30 (concluding that the VRA’s 
preclearance formula no longer reflected current conditions).  
 176. See id. at 2618 (“[T]he conditions that originally justified these 
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”).  
 177. See id. at 2625 (“[V]oter turnout and registration rates now approach 
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And 
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” (quoting Nw. Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009))). 
 178. See id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court today 
terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to block” the discrimination 
targeted by the VRA).  
 179. See, e.g., Kareem Crayton & Jane Junn, Five Justices, Section 4, and 
Three Ways Forward in Voting Rights, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 
113 (2013) (“[T]he decision is one of several demonstrating the Court’s 
skepticism about federal safeguards for racial minorities’ role in political 
discourse.”); Richard Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 726–38 (2014) (criticizing the Court’s analysis in 
Shelby County as “false minimalism”); Joel Keller, Shelby County and the End 
of History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 357, 358 (2013) (discussing the Court’s failure to 
recognize the power of the past and the burden of memory likewise resulted in 
an incomplete analysis of the continued necessity, and thus the continued 
constitutionality, of the federal-oversight provision). 
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voting rights.180 Rather, just as in Coleman, the Shelby County 
Court omitted any statement about the importance of the right 
and how that importance influenced its enforcement power 
analysis. Instead, and again distantly, but distinctly echoing 
Coleman, the Court focused on whether the enforcement statute 
constituted a well-designed weapon against the constitutional 
violations the statute targeted.181 
Thus, Coleman and Shelby County may herald a new 
approach to enforcement power analysis, one that deemphasizes 
or even ignores the constitutional status of the right the 
enforcement statute seeks to protect and focuses instead on how 
well the statute accomplishes its stated task. If so, one must 
wonder whether this new approach supersedes or provides an 
alternative to the one applied in Kimel, Garrett, Hibbs, and Lane, 
or instead, whether such an “effectiveness” inquiry constitutes a 
new threshold test that applies before the approach in the Kimel 
line is triggered. In any event, it is clear that analysis under the 
                                                                                                     
 180. Indeed, for this reason, one scholar, who otherwise applauds the 
Court’s use of its own constitutional rights doctrine to establish the degree of 
latitude Congress enjoys to enforce that particular right (the approach taken in 
Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs), expressed concern about the then-impending 
possibility that the Court could invalidate the VRA’s preclearance provisions. 
See Lee, supra note 134, at 502 (discussing the preclearance provisions); id. 
(“Race discrimination, no less under the Fifteenth Amendment than the 
Fourteenth, is the most suspect kind of state action. When Congress acts 
pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers to 
combat such action, those enactments must be given the widest berth 
possible.”). 
 181. Compare Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013) 
In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a 
recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, 
and those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage 
formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided 
along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if 
it were.  
With Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 40 (2012) (describing the 
plaintiff’s justification of the FMLA’s family care leave provision as “overly 
complicated” and “unpersuasive”). To be sure, Shelby County also relied on other 
rationales to cast doubt on the coverage formula. Most notably, it argued that a 
principle of “equal sovereignty” presumptively required that burdens placed on 
all states be equal—a requirement that was not met by the coverage formula’s 
selection of particular states and counties to bear the burdens of the 
preclearance provisions. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (“[T]he 
fundamental principles of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in 
assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”).  
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congruence and proportionality standard—which had been 
relatively stable, if controversial—may be becoming unsettled. It 
is also possible that these cases herald an Enforcement Clause 
doctrine unmoored from underlying constitutional rights 
doctrine, in which the Court engages in standardless, ad hoc 
scrutiny of an enforcement statute’s effectiveness.182 These 
possibilities behoove us to consider how congruence and 
proportionality review might operate in new enforcement clause 
contexts, such as legislation enforcing the Second Amendment. 
III. Heller, Its Methodology, and Lower Court Applications 
Since the Court’s 2008 Heller decision, finding the Second 
Amendment to guarantee a personal right of gun possession, and 
especially its 2010 McDonald decision, which incorporated that 
right to apply against the states, lower courts have puzzled over a 
variety of issues related to the gun possession right.183 Most 
fundamentally, they have considered the doctrinal significance of 
the distinction between what Heller described as the “core”184 
right of law-abiding citizens to use commonly-preferred weapons 
to defend themselves in their home and presumptively less “core” 
possession rights. Relatedly, they have considered the proper 
standard of review for evaluating restrictions on different 
locations for gun possession (e.g., in the home or in public), 
restrictions on possessing certain types of weapons, and 
restrictions on possession by different types of persons (e.g., 
felons, recipients of domestic violence restraining orders, and 
mentally ill persons).185 Finally, they have considered the proper 
                                                                                                     
 182. See generally William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis, 18 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2015) [hereinafter Araiza, Crisis] (discussing 
problems with the Court’s current approach to congruence and proportionality 
review).  
 183. See supra notes 152–159 (discussing the issues that the Supreme Court 
has left unresolved regarding gun possession rights). 
 184. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (stating 
that requiring firearms to be kept inoperable in the home prevents people from 
being able to protect their home, the “core” reason to possess a firearm). 
 185. See id. at 626–27 (“[O]ur opinion should [not] be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings . . . .”). 
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analytical framework for analyzing restrictions on collateral 
rights related to gun possession and use (e.g., restrictions on 
target practice facilities and on the sale of firearms).186 
The Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance on 
these difficult questions. Because both Heller and McDonald 
dealt with infringements on what Heller described as the core 
Second Amendment right,187 they did not have cause to address 
other gun regulations that cannot be so described.188 Aside from a 
brief per curiam opinion described by a concurring justice as 
“grudging,” which held that the Second Amendment protects the 
possession of stun guns, since McDonald, the Court has 
steadfastly refused to comment on the scope of the Second 
Amendment right.189 This silence is not for lack of opportunity to 
speak, because McDonald made the Second Amendment “fully 
applicable” to the states,190 the Court has denied certiorari in 
several cases where the lower court has upheld a gun 
restriction—sometimes in the face of a vigorous dissent from that 
denial.191 
                                                                                                     
 186. Other scholars have described these issues slightly differently. See, e.g., 
Volokh, supra note 3, 1443 (describing “scope justifications,” “burden 
justifications,” “danger reduction justifications,” and “government as proprietor 
justifications” for regulating gun possession). 
 187. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (describing the law in terms that make it 
clear that it infringes the right the majority described as the core of the Second 
Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749 (2010) (describing 
the laws challenged in that case as “similar” to the District of Columbia law so 
described in Heller). 
 188. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[T]here will be time enough to expound 
upon the historical justifications for the [gun regulations the Court suggested 
were constitutional] if and when those [regulations] come before us.”). 
 189. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1033 (2016) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[t]his Court’s grudging per curiam now sends the case 
back to” the same state court that rejected the Second Amendment claim 
originally). 
 190. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (“Applying the standard that is well 
established in our case law, we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully 
applicable to the States.”). 
 191. See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996–2000 (2017) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (stating disapproval of the Court denying certiorari); Friedman v. 
City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447–50 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(same); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (same); Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323, 2323 (2017) 
(Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting without opinion from denial 
of certiorari).  
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This failure to clarify the Second Amendment right is also 
not due to the lack of need for such clarification. On the contrary, 
lower courts interpreting the Second Amendment have disagreed 
with each other192 and have often been quite tentative in the 
breadth of their holdings.193 This lack of a confident consensus 
among the lower courts reflects fundamental difficulties in 
creating a coherent Second Amendment jurisprudence. Those 
difficulties, while themselves noteworthy, are not the main focus 
of this Article. Rather, this Article focuses on how those 
difficulties will further complicate the already-challenging task of 
applying congruence and proportionality review to legislation 
enforcing the Second Amendment. In turn, that complexity will 
illustrate the broader problem courts will have in applying the 
congruence and proportionality standard to legislation enforcing 
other substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause.194  
This Part of the Article begins the process of proving these 
propositions by examining the complexities of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence and considering how they impact the 
enforcement power as it relates to the Second Amendment.195 
Part IV considers how the Court’s extant approaches to 
congruence and proportionality review might respond to the 
challenges posted by Second Amendment enforcement 
legislation.196 Part V will offer a more granular approach to the 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2016) (recognizing its 
disagreement with other courts about the proper analysis of the 
constitutionality of complete prohibitions on certain types of weapons). 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 
2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)  
There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places 
beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what 
the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of 
scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other 
questions . . . . The whole matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita 
that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small 
degree.  
See also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (declining to 
“get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” than necessary to decide 
the case in front of before it). 
 194. See infra Part VII (noting the crucial need for a new approach). 
 195. See infra notes 199–241 and accompanying text (discussing the Second 
Amendment caselaw and its implications). 
 196. See infra Part IV (discussing the different paths the Court could take if 
ARMING THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1841 
Second Amendment enforcement issue.197 Part VI will conclude 
by suggesting that this approach may be more generally useful 
when the Court confronts legislation enforcing other substantive 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.198 
A. The Second Amendment’s Emerging Doctrinal Structure 
Much of the difficulty courts have experienced in Second 
Amendment cases stems from Heller’s identification of a “core” 
right of law-abiding citizens to possess a gun for self-defense,199 
and its further observation that that right is “most acute” in the 
home.200 This identification of a Second Amendment “core” 
logically implies the existence of a Second Amendment periphery 
consisting of gun possession rights that are not part of the 
amendment’s core, but nevertheless enjoy some degree of 
constitutional protection.201 Indeed, lower courts have recognized 
not only such peripheral possession rights, but also penumbral 
rights beyond mere possession.202 
This recognition of a Second Amendment core and periphery 
has helped create a structure in which a given gun control law 
may be subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny, depending 
on how closely the regulations approach the heart of the Second 
                                                                                                     
presented a Second Amendment question). 
 197. See infra Part V (discussing each step of the Second Amendment 
analysis in greater detail). 
 198. See infra Part VI (discussing the enforcement of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights more generally).  
 199. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (stating 
that a law preventing one from having the ability to protect his home is 
unconstitutional); see also id. at 599 (defining self-defense as “the central 
component” of the Second Amendment right). 
 200. See id. at 628 (describing the gun prohibition in the challenged law as 
“extend[ing], moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, 
and property is most acute”). 
 201. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(referencing passages from Heller that “alone, though short of dispositive, 
strongly suggest that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a firearm 
in some fashion outside the home”); see also infra note 211 and accompanying 
text (discussing protection in the home). 
 202. See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) 
[hereinafter Ezell I] (protecting the right to access a firing range); Ezell v. City 
of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Ezell II] (same).  
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Amendment right. That complex structure poses a difficult 
enough challenge for any inquiry into whether a federal gun 
rights enforcement law is congruent and proportional to the 
underlying Second Amendment right. But the matter becomes 
even more complicated when one realizes that these inquiries 
require different interpretive methodologies. In turn, those 
different methodologies relate in different ways to Congress’s 
particular institutional capacities compared with those of 
courts—and thus have different impacts on the latitude and 
deference Congress should enjoy in enacting enforcement 
legislation.  
Consider one relatively common lower court approach to 
Second Amendment issues in which the first step requires a 
historical analysis of whether a particular gun possession right, 
or the exercise of that right by a particular person, falls 
completely outside the protection offered by the Second 
Amendment.203 For example, when considering whether domestic 
violence misdemeanants enjoy the constitutional right to possess 
a gun, a number of courts have examined whether historically 
such persons had enjoyed that right. Some courts that answer 
that question in the negative (that is, courts that have found that 
historically such persons did not enjoy gun possession rights) 
have stopped their analysis at that point.204 By contrast, courts 
concluding that such persons did in fact enjoy that right have 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing 
an approach starting with this scope inquiry as one adopted by a majority of the 
federal circuit courts); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing this as the 
“prevailing” approach); see also Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703 (applying this analysis). 
Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1449–53 (noting a preliminary “scope” question in 
Second Amendment cases, asking whether the asserted gun possession conduct 
is entirely outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection); Rosenthal, 
supra note 3, at 1200 (“[T]he first prong, while ostensibly focused on historical 
evidence of original meaning, operates only to defeat Second Amendment 
claims.”).  
 204. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) 
The first question [in Second Amendment analysis] is whether the 
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope 
of the Second Amendment's guarantee. This historical inquiry seeks 
to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be 
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, 
then the challenged law is valid. 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).  
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then applied some level of ends-means scrutiny, with the 
intensity of that scrutiny often turning on the proximity of the 
asserted right (now held to be within the Second Amendment’s 
overall zone of protection) to the Amendment’s core.205  
The cases applying this approach reveal the existence of up 
to five analytical steps, each of which is governed by a distinct 
methodology.206 The first step—determining whether the asserted 
right comes within the Second Amendment’s protected zone at 
all—appears to require a binary yes/no decision, reached, at least 
in most cases, by a historical analysis.207 The second step—
determining whether the challenged law constitutes a substantial 
burden on the right208—requires some degree of judgment from 
                                                                                                     
 205. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195 (“[A] ‘severe burden on the core 
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense should require a strong 
justification,’ but . . . ‘laws that do not implicate the central self-defense concern 
of the Second Amendment . . . may be more easily justified . . . .’” (quoting 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682)). 
 206. Courts have often described this approach as entailing simply two 
steps—the “scope” inquiry the text identifies as the first step, and then the 
selection and application of the appropriate scrutiny level, which courts often 
describe as one step, but may include as many as four. See supra note 203 
(citing examples). 
 207. See, e.g., Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821 (“Under [Ninth Circuit] case law, 
the court in the first step asks if the challenged law burdens conduct protected 
by the Second Amendment, based on a historical understanding of the scope of 
the right.” (internal quotation omitted)). To be sure, courts have expressed 
doubts about their ability to competently perform such an analysis, in part 
because of the anachronistic nature of many of these questions. See, e.g., Allan 
Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second 
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 750 (2012) (“[R]ecognizing the difficulty 
of making comparisons across centuries during which so many vast 
technological, legal, social, and other changes have occurred.”); id. at 752 n.315 
(citing cases acknowledging this problem in the context of laws restricting gun 
rights for domestic violence misdemeanants); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 
(“Moreover, it appears to us that the historical data is not conclusive on the 
question of whether the founding era understanding was that the Second 
Amendment did not apply to felons.”); Carlton F.W. Lawson, Four Exceptions in 
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009) (noting the difficulty of justifying an 
originalist-based conclusion about the constitutionality of felon disarmament 
laws); see also Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 704–06 (analyzing whether target range 
regulation was a longstanding historical practice that immunized such 
regulation from Second Amendment review); County of San Diego, 824 F.3d at 
939 (using the same history-centered review when determining whether the 
Second Amendment protected the right to carry a concealed weapon). 
 208. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1202 (noting this inquiry). 
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the court. A judge confronting this question would presumably 
have to apply the empirical facts of the situation (literally, how 
burdensome the regulation is) to a legal standard that might 
draw its content from other constitutional rights doctrines that 
impose an analogous requirement.209 The third step—
determining the proximity of the asserted right to the Heller-
identified Second Amendment “core”210—also requires judgment. 
Recall that Heller described the need for self-defense as “most 
acute” in the home, thus, as one judge has written, “suggesting 
that some form of the right applies where that need is not ‘most 
acute.’”211 Determining how to analyze claimed infringements of 
that less central “form of the right” requires judges to make a 
choice that is presumably not a binary one, unless (implausibly) 
all rights other than home self-defense fall into the same category 
with respect to their distance from Heller’s home-centered core. 
Such a decision, then, inevitably requires a degree of sensitive 
judgment, akin to locating a right on a sliding scale of importance 
or fundamentality.212 The fourth step—settling on the applicable 
scrutiny level—presumably turns to a great degree on the 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (noting the existence of analogous 
“burden” inquiries in other constitutional rights doctrines). 
 210. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (“We must 
also address the District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun) 
that firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times. This 
makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense and is hence unconstitutional.”). 
 211. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Niemeyer, J., writing separately) (“The Court stated that its holding applies to 
the home, where the need ‘for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,’ 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (emphasis added), suggesting that some form of the 
right applies where that need is not ‘most acute.’”). But see Peruta v. County of 
San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014) (suggesting that armed 
self-defense is a core Second Amendment right wherever it occurs). 
 212. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (using 
sliding scale imagery to describe how to determine the appropriate standard of 
review based on an estimation of the proximity of the claimed right to the 
Second Amendment core and the severity of the burden); Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 
708 (7th Cir. 2011) 
[L]aws restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second 
Amendment right, laws that merely regulate . . . and modest 
burdens . . . may be more easily justified. How much more easily 
depends on the relative severity of the burden and its proximity to the 
core of the right.  
(emphasis added).  
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outcome of the third step—that is, on how the court characterizes 
the right’s proximity to the core of the Second Amendment.213 
Finally, the fifth step—applying that scrutiny—involves 
evaluating policy considerations about the importance of the 
asserted government interests, the effectiveness of the law in 
accomplishing those interests, and the availability of alternative 
means of attaining those interests.214 
B. Second Amendment Doctrine and Congressional Enforcement 
Power 
These steps thus reflect a variety of decision-making 
methodologies: historical inquiries seeking a yes/no answer to the 
protected status of gun possession conduct, judgments about the 
severity of the burden a law places on a claimed right and about 
the proximity of particular conduct to the core conduct the Second 
Amendment protects, doctrinal decisions about the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply, and policy-laden analysis applying the 
scrutiny level ultimately chosen.215 The sheer range of these 
approaches alone would seriously complicate a court’s 
examination into whether a federal gun rights enforcement 
statute was congruent and proportional to the underlying right it 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821 (using sliding scale imagery); Ezell I, 651 
F.3d at 708 (describing the appropriate standard of review in that particular 
case as “more rigorous . . . than that applied” in an earlier Second Amendment 
case, “if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’”). 
 214. Indeed, such analysis could come quite close to the “interest balancing” 
Justice Scalia criticized in Heller. See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 710 (concluding that 
“the [challenged] firing-range ban is wholly out of proportion to the public 
interests the City claims it serves”). 
 215. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1446 (proposing that courts adopt a 
three-step test: (1) a scope inquiry; (2) an inquiry into the burden level the 
regulation imposes on the right; and (3) an inquiry into the “danger reduction” 
the regulation accomplishes, which roughly tracks, respectively, steps one, two 
to three, and four to five in the text); Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1200–01 
(describing “the prevailing approach” as involving a “two-pronged inquiry”—an 
initial scope inquiry followed by the application of “an appropriate form of 
means-end scrutiny” (citations omitted)); id. at 1201 (identifying that second 
prong as involving “two analytically distinct steps, in which, first, the extent of 
the burden on the right of lawful, armed defense is assessed in order to 
determine, then, the extent to which the challenged regulation will be regarded 
as constitutionally suspect” (citations omitted)). 
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sought to protect. But the problem is even more serious than 
that. If a court’s performance of congruence and proportionality 
review seeks to account for Congress’s institutional strengths in 
making particular types of determinations,216 that review would 
have to take several different forms in the process of analyzing 
the same enforcement statute. 
Yet another complexity also bears noting before we apply this 
approach to the enforcement power. The Court’s decisions in 
Kimel217 and Garrett,218 to accord skeptical scrutiny to 
enforcement legislation because the law in question protected a 
non-suspect class, are subject to the criticism that it elevates 
suspect class analysis, and the tiered scrutiny that follows, from 
the status of mere decisional heuristic to constitutional law. Both 
judges219 and scholars220 have observed that suspect class 
analysis, and in particular the deference the rational basis 
standard shows to legislation burdening groups that fall under 
the default “non-suspect” category, reflects judicial restraint 
rather than core constitutional meaning. Those critics observe 
that such judicial restraint may be admirable, but does not 
justify cabining congressional power, given the character of 
                                                                                                     
 216. I have argued elsewhere that congruence and proportionality review 
should in fact take account of Congress’s particular institutional capabilities, 
and how those capabilities allow Congress to provide appropriate and 
meaningful input to the task of vindicating constitutional rights. See ARAIZA, 
ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 258 (arguing for incorporating congressional 
institutional capacities to bolster Congress’s role in constitutional rights 
vindication); see also William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Factfinding 
in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 882 
(2013) [hereinafter Araiza, Deference] (explaining the particular types of 
legislative findings in rights-protecting legislation that merit the most and the 
least judicial deference). 
 217. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000) (applying 
skeptical review in the age discrimination context). 
 218. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357 (2001) (applying 
skeptical review in a case brought under the ADA). 
 219. See id. at 382–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Rational-basis review—with 
its presumptions favoring constitutionality—is ‘a paradigm of judicial 
restraint.’” (emphasis added) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 314 (1993))). 
 220. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Segal, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretations of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1967 (2003) (discussing judicial reluctance to “closely 
scrutinize legislative choices” as a reflection of rational basis review as judicial 
restraint). 
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rational basis review, and suspect class analysis more generally, 
as a decisional heuristic motivated by concerns about 
institutional competence rather than a statement of core 
constitutional meaning.221 As a result, congruence and 
proportionality review focused on the results of suspect class 
analysis—that is, the review performed by the Court in the 
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy—ends up testing enforcement 
legislation for congruence and proportionality against the wrong 
referent—the benefitted group’s suspect class status—rather 
than core constitutional meaning itself.222  
For our purposes, this critique means that before the Second 
Amendment doctrinal steps noted earlier become relevant to 
enforcement legislation, they must be evaluated to determine 
whether they constitute core constitutional law as opposed to 
mere decisional heuristics. This is not a novel distinction. Nearly 
thirty years ago, Lawrence Sager’s classic article on 
underenforced constitutional norms distinguished between 
“institutional” and “analytical” justifications for judicial decisions 
enforcing rights.223 According to Dean Sager, court decisions 
relying on concerns about institutional competence to justify 
narrow readings of rights result in rights that should be 
considered judicially underenforced, and thus appropriately 
subject to additional protection by other actors, including 
Congress when it uses its Enforcement Clause authority.224 By 
contrast, “analytical” reasons for reading a right narrowly relate 
to the Court’s “understanding of the [constitutional] concept 
itself.”225 The results of such latter analyses were, in Dean 
Sager’s view, less susceptible to supplementation by other actors, 
                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 8, at 21 n.95 (citing scholars making a 
similar argument). 
 222. I have made this argument in other venues. For this discussion, see 
ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 141–69. 
 223. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217–18 (1978) 
(“What I want to distinguish between here are reasons for limiting a judicial 
construct of a constitutional concept which are based upon questions of 
propriety or capacity and those which are based upon an understanding of the 
concept itself.”). 
 224. See id. at 1228–42 (discussing cases in which the underenforcement 
thesis is properly applied). 
 225. Id. at 1218. 
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at least when such supplementation was performed under the 
banner of enforcing or vindicating that right.226 While he wrote 
two decades before Boerne and Boerne’s application to equal 
protection enforcing legislation, Dean Sager’s distinction 
foreshadowed both judicial and scholarly critiques of the Court’s 
skeptical review of such legislation.227  
Dean Sager’s institutional/analytical distinction requires 
that we consider the degree to which the Second Amendment is 
judicially “underenforced” and thus appropriately susceptible to 
aggressive congressional supplementation via the Enforcement 
Clause.228 Unfortunately, the complexity of Second Amendment 
doctrine means that this inquiry does not always yield an 
unambiguous answer. Sometimes the inquiry is straightforward. 
Most notably, the first step in Second Amendment analysis—
whether, as a historical matter, particular gun possession 
conduct was understood as protected by the Second 
Amendment—is answered (at least ostensibly229) by an analysis 
that relies heavily on constitutional text and originalist 
analysis.230 Without engaging the ongoing, well-known, and 
voluminously-documented debate about the merits of originalism, 
or whether it constitutes the only legitimate approach to 
constitutional interpretation,231 the fact that originalist analysis 
                                                                                                     
 226. See id. at 1240 (“[W]here, because of analytical . . . concerns, the Court 
has determined that given conduct does no violence to the substantive norm of 
the fourteenth amendment, Congress cannot use section 5 as authority to 
legislate against that conduct.”). 
 227. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382–85 (2001) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court’s application of rational-basis review); 
William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of 
Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s 
Equal Protection Clause decisions under rational-basis review reflect the same 
distinction Dean Sager drew). 
 228. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing the 
underenforcement thesis as applied to specific cases). 
 229. See supra note 207 (citing sources conceding the difficulty courts have 
encountered reaching reliable conclusions under such analysis). 
 230. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing examination of historical evidence and historical understanding as 
the first step in determining a challenged law’s burden on conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment). 
 231. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) 
(noting a variety of “modalities,” or tools, of constitutional interpretation). 
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self-consciously aims at uncovering the core law of the 
Constitution suggests that this first doctrinal step is not a 
decisional heuristic.232 To use Dean Sager’s terminology, this first 
doctrinal step relies on “analytical” reasoning rather than 
concerns about courts’ “institutional” limitations.233 As such, the 
room for congressional supplementation is correspondingly 
narrowed. As set out below, other doctrinal steps may not have 
that status. Thus, Congress may enjoy more latitude to 
contribute to courts’ resolution of those latter steps. 
Consider an example illustrating the methodological variety 
of these steps. Hypothesize a federal law that protects the rights 
of Americans to carry loaded guns in their automobiles. A 
defender of that law’s constitutionality as “appropriate” 
legislation enforcing the Second Amendment234 might first argue 
that carriage of a gun in a car, by analogy to historical 
antecedents, comes within the protection of the Second 
Amendment.235 She might then argue that the federal 
enforcement statute protects against state laws that completely 
prohibit, or at least severely restrict, such carriage, and thus that 
the federal law protects against substantial burdens on the 
Second Amendment right. 
That same person might then argue that the prevalence of 
automobile travel today, and the nature of one’s automobile as a 
fundamentally private space, render the need for self-defense 
while traveling only slightly less “acute” than Heller’s core home 
self-defense right.236 She might then argue that the importance of 
                                                                                                     
 232. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854  
Central to [Chief Justice Marshall’s defense of judicial review in 
Marbury v. Madison] . . . is the perception that the Constitution . . . is 
in its nature the sort of “law” that is the business of the courts—an 
enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual 
devices familiar to those learned in the law.  
(emphasis added). 
 233. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1218 (noting the analytical framework). 
 234. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress to enact 
“appropriate” legislation enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
 235. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (considering a 
somewhat analogous question in the context of the Fourth Amendment). 
 236. For a provocative examination of the role of the automobile as a locus 
for intensely private pursuits, see generally Sara Seo, The New Public, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1616 (2016). 
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that right justifies its careful protection from state regulation, 
i.e., that such state regulation should trigger strict scrutiny—a 
result that, in turn, would give Congress more leeway to enforce 
that right, at least under the Court’s existing enforcement power 
template.237 Finally, she could argue, as part of the ultimate 
review of the law for congruence and proportionality, that 
Congress merits deference when it makes determinations about 
the social reality of both the safety risks of driving (for example, 
long-distance driving through sparsely populated areas or 
sleeping in one’s car) and, conversely, the public safety risks of 
loaded guns in cars. 
The point is not so much that each of these steps would 
present courts with a challenge—although each one surely would. 
Rather, the main point is that the focus of congruence and 
proportionality review would have to continually shift, as the 
methodology for judging the enforcement statute shifted with 
each step in the analytical sequence outlined above. Further, as 
the methodology shifted, the deference due Congress’s 
determinations would similarly shift, as the character of courts’ 
analysis moves (to use Dean Sager’s terminology) between 
analytical and institutional. For example, a court might well 
conclude that Congress’s conclusion about the historical pedigree 
of unrestricted carriage of weapons did not merit any particular 
deference, since that would be a conclusion about historical 
practice, a topic about which Congress does not enjoy any 
particular expertise or authority relative to courts. Indeed, to the 
extent originalist analysis purports to uncover core constitutional 
meaning based on Dean Sager’s “analytical” reasoning, a court 
decision allowing Congress to make the relevant originalist 
determinations about the scope of a constitutional right would 
                                                                                                     
 237. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) 
(concluding that the heightened protection accorded sex equality under the 
Fourteenth Amendment made it “easier for Congress to show a pattern of state 
constitutional violations” justifying enforcement legislation); id. at 735 
(comparing its review of sex equality-enforcement legislation with legislation 
enforcing the equal protection rights of non-suspect classes, and concluding that 
the non-suspect nature of the benefitted classes imposed on Congress a tougher 
evidentiary burden when seeking to justify that latter type of legislation); see 
also supra note 134 (citing authorities describing the Court’s Enforcement 
Clause jurisprudence as applied to equality-enforcing legislation as turning 
heavily on the suspect class status of the group that legislation seeks to protect). 
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essentially cede to Congress the power to declare such core 
meaning, in contravention of Boerne.238 By contrast, its 
conclusions about the acuteness of the need for self-defense while 
driving might well merit deference, given Congress’s presumed 
superior knowledge of, and ability to draw conclusions about, 
social reality in 21st-century America.239  
This very quick discussion of the automobile carriage 
hypothetical does not even begin to provide a complete analysis of 
the implications of Second Amendment doctrine for congressional 
attempts to enforce gun possession rights. More comprehensive 
analyses of Congress’s power to enforce the Second Amendment 
follow in Parts IV and V.240 What this brief discussion illustrates, 
however, is the variety and complexity of the questions that 
underlying doctrine poses for the enforcement power.241 The 
prospect of enforcement legislation protecting Second 
Amendment rights, and the possibility of enforcement legislation 
protecting substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights more 
generally, demands an approach to the enforcement power 
question that accounts for this variety and complexity. 
IV. Arming the Second Amendment: Existing Approaches 
Given the little that we know so far about the Supreme 
Court’s approach to Second Amendment adjudication, what 
doctrinal paths would present themselves should the Court 
confront legislation enforcing Second Amendment rights? Part 
II’s discussion of the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence 
suggests some possibilities.242 However, those possibilities are 
                                                                                                     
 238. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (stating that 
Congress’s passage of the RFRA was an “attempt [to] change . . . constitutional 
protections” rather than remedial or preventive legislation). 
 239. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (arguing that 
Congress’s superior understanding of contemporary social reality should trigger 
judicial deference to congressional determinations based on such 
understanding). 
 240. See infra Parts IV, V (applying existing approaches to the enforcement 
power to Second Amendment issues and offering a new approach).  
 241. See supra Part III (noting the variety and complexity of questions posed 
by underlying Second Amendment doctrine).  
 242. See supra Part II (discussing the Court’s extant Enforcement Clause 
doctrine).  
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complicated by the doctrinal approaches adopted in part by the 
Heller Court and by the lower courts charged with applying 
Heller to different types of regulations, as discussed in Part III.243 
This Part of this Article re-examines those possibilities in light of 
the complexities of Second Amendment doctrine.244 Part V offers 
another approach to Congress’s power to enforce the Second 
Amendment, and, by analogy, its power to enforce other 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive rights provisions.245 
A. The Equal Protection/Tiered Scrutiny Approach 
An important part of the Court’s post-Boerne Enforcement 
Clause jurisprudence consists of the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy 
of equal protection enforcement cases.246 In those cases the Court 
adopted strong presumptions disfavoring or favoring enforcement 
legislation based on, respectively, the presumptive 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the conduct that 
legislation targets.247 For example, as discussed in more detail in 
Part II, in Garrett, the Court’s skeptical enforcement power 
review of the ADA’s employment provisions flowed largely from 
what the Court described as the constitutionally trivial status of 
disability discrimination.248 By contrast, two years later in Hibbs, 
                                                                                                     
 243. See supra Part III (identifying the approaches to Second Amendment 
questions taken by lower courts).  
 244. See infra notes 246–341 (reexamining the Second Amendment 
Enforcement Clause issue in light of underlying Second Amendment doctrine).  
 245. See infra Part V (offering a new, more granular, approach to 
Enforcement Clause doctrine). 
 246. This Article does not extensively discuss Morrison, given its primary 
focus on the fact that the VAWA did not directly regulate states. See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (“Section 13981 is also different 
from these previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly throughout 
the Nation. Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of discrimination 
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or 
even most States.”). 
 247. See supra notes 103–133 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimel, 
Garrett, and Hibbs decisions); see also Massey, supra note 8, 9–14 (embracing 
the methodology in those three cases as a general approach to enforcement 
power cases); Lee, supra note 180, at 488–89 (embracing that methodology). 
 248. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (“The 
legislative record of the ADA . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact 
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the 
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the Court’s far more hospitable reception to the FMLA’s family-
care leave provision largely stemmed from the Court’s recognition 
that sex discrimination poses a serious constitutional concern.249 
As the Court stated in Hibbs, the more serious constitutional 
question sex discrimination poses made it “easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”250 
Judges and scholars have critiqued the Court’s heavy 
reliance on suspect class analysis in its enforcement power 
jurisprudence, arguing that the results of such analysis 
constitute judicial heuristics rather than core constitutional 
law.251 As explained earlier,252 congruence and proportionality 
review focused on the results of suspect class analysis—that is, 
the review performed by the Court in the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs 
trilogy—ends up testing enforcement legislation for congruence 
and proportionality against the wrong referent—the benefitted 
group’s suspect class status—rather than core constitutional 
meaning itself.253 To return to Dean Sager’s terminology,254 when 
such heuristics take the form of deferential rational basis review, 
the resulting institutional competence-motivated judicial 
restraint is best understood as resulting in an underenforced 
constitutional norm. In turn, that underenforcement leaves room 
for appropriate exercises of other branches’ powers to more fully 
vindicate that norm.255  
This critique is partially moot in the case of the Second 
Amendment. In Heller, the Court downplayed reliance on 
heuristics such as tiered scrutiny, in favor of direct, unmediated 
                                                                                                     
disabled.”). 
 249. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“The 
impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA is significant.”). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Massey, supra note 8, at 21 n.95 (citing scholars making a similar 
argument). 
 252. See supra notes 219–222 and accompanying text (discussing rational 
basis review and judicial restraint as it relates to suspect class analysis). 
 253. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (providing other venues in 
which the same argument is made). 
 254. See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text (discussing Dean 
Sager’s underenforcement thesis). 
 255. See supra note 224 (discussing the underenforcement thesis as applied 
to specific cases). 
1854 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) 
examination of the core constitutional right.256 That search for 
core constitutional meaning led the majority to conclude that the 
Second Amendment—on its own, unmediated by decision rules 
such as suspect class analysis—protected the right of law-abiding 
citizens to possess a commonly-owned type of functioning gun for 
self-defense purposes in the home.257 Because the challenged 
District of Columbia law prevented such possession,258 the Court 
found it to violate the core meaning of the Second Amendment.259 
To be sure, lower courts after Heller have not been able to 
avoid tiered scrutiny analysis as easily as Heller itself, given that 
they have had to confront gun restrictions that did not destroy 
the core right as Justice Scalia described it.260 Nevertheless, 
tiered scrutiny in Second Amendment cases may differ from its 
equal protection cousin in not being based on judicial heuristics. 
In particular, courts in Second Amendment cases have decided to 
apply such scrutiny not based on any mediating principle such as 
political process analysis, but instead as a reflection of the impact 
of the law on core Second Amendment values.261 Thus, tiered 
scrutiny analysis in Second Amendment cases may in fact have a 
closer connection to core constitutional law than in the equal 
protection context, even if it still reflects the “interest balancing” 
Justice Scalia derided in Heller.262 For that reason, court 
                                                                                                     
 256. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–605 (2008) 
(examining the constitutional meaning of the Second Amendment by examining 
the operative clause, prefatory clause, their meanings, and the relationship 
between the clauses). 
 257. See id. at 573–636 (using the meaning of the Second Amendment to 
support the right of citizens to own and possess a firearm for self-defense). 
 258. The law struck down in Heller prohibited the possession of handguns in 
the home and required that lawfully possessed guns (such as long guns) kept in 
the home be kept in a dissembled state, so as to render them non-functional. Id. 
at 575. 
 259. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition 
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense.”). 
 260. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1203–04 (noting the prevalence of 
“interest-balancing” in post-Heller lower court litigation). 
 261. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that the level of scrutiny in such non-core cases turns on the proximity of the 
infringed-upon right to the Second Amendment’s core and the challenged law’s 
degree of intrusion into that right). 
 262. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“The Second Amendment is no different 
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decisions about the relevant scrutiny level may reflect less 
underenforcement of the Second Amendment right than 
analogous decisions in equal protection cases.263 Thus, such 
Second Amendment decisions may leave relatively less room for 
aggressive enforcement legislation, as compared with the 
situation with equal protection.264 
But another, more practical, problem arises when we 
consider the utility of Second Amendment tiered scrutiny to the 
enforcement power question. In the decade since Heller, courts 
considering Second Amendment claims have often selected 
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard.265 This causes 
not a conceptual problem like the one identified above, but 
rather, an indeterminacy problem. Put bluntly, in comparison to 
rational basis or strict scrutiny review, intermediate scrutiny (at 
least in its classic incarnation266) provides far less of a predictable 
thumb on the scale either favoring or disfavoring the 
constitutionality of enforcement legislation.267 That 
indeterminacy would likely be particularly pronounced in the 
Second Amendment context, given that such scrutiny is triggered 
                                                                                                     
[from the First Amendment]. Like the First, it is the very product of an interest 
balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them 
anew.”). 
 263. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1218, 1228–42 (discussing the 
underenforcement thesis and the difference in “institutional” and “analytical” 
reasons for examining rights). 
 264. See id. (examining the need for other actors to supplement 
constitutional rights based on the Court’s use of analytical versus institutional 
readings of rights). 
 265. See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 827 (using intermediate scrutiny in analyzing 
a law regulating firearm use and ownership); see also United States v. Hosford, 
843 F.3d 161, 168–70 (4th Cir. 2016) (same). 
 266. By “classic incarnation,” I mean the formulation which self-consciously 
locates itself “between [the] extremes of rational basis and strict scrutiny,” 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1986), rather than the version espoused in 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 571–72 (1996) (citing Jeter), which has 
been described as a type of proto-strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Kevin Rolando, A 
Decade Later: United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of “Skeptical 
Scrutiny,” 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 182, 182–85 (2006) (labeling the 
Court’s use of a toughened intermediate scrutiny in United States v. Virginia as 
more akin to strict scrutiny). 
 267. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next 
Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1953, 1997–98 (2006) (citing and discussing scholars’ 
characterizations of intermediate scrutiny as indeterminate). 
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by infringements on gun rights that are conceded to be peripheral 
to the core right Heller recognized, but which nevertheless enjoy 
meaningful constitutional protection.268 It is thus difficult to see 
how courts’ use of intermediate scrutiny predictably influences 
the outcome of a congruence and proportionality analysis, in the 
way that the Court’s use of rational basis scrutiny for age and 
disability discrimination effectively doomed the enforcement 
power argument for, respectively, the ADEA in Kimel and the 
ADA in Garrett, and in the way that employment of heightened 
scrutiny for sex discrimination269 effectively paved the way for 
the Court’s approval of the FMLA in Hibbs.270  
B. The Due Process Approach 
The Court’s due process enforcement cases may provide a 
more promising approach to the Court’s evaluation of Second 
Amendment enforcement legislation. Indeed, focusing on those 
cases makes intuitive sense, given that a plurality of the Court 
found that the Due Process Clause provided the appropriate 
doctrinal home for an incorporated Second Amendment.271 Since 
                                                                                                     
 268. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 692–99 
(6th Cir. 2016) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law denying a gun 
license to anyone who had ever been committed to a mental institution, and 
finding that application of that law to the plaintiff failed that level of scrutiny). 
 269. To repeat a point made earlier, while sex discrimination ostensibly 
receives the same “intermediate scrutiny,” the accompanying text describes as 
providing only indeterminate guidance for the congruence and proportionality 
inquiry; by the time Hibbs was decided sex discrimination had been treated by 
the Court in a way that suggested not “classic” intermediate scrutiny, but rather 
something approaching strict scrutiny. See supra note 266 and accompanying 
text (discussing differences between a “classic” version of intermediate scrutiny 
and a more toughened version similar to strict scrutiny). Thus, that level of 
scrutiny did in fact provide significant guidance for the Court in Hibbs, even 
while I suggest that “classic” intermediate scrutiny may not provide similar 
guidance in the Second Amendment context. 
 270. See Lee, supra note 180, at 496–97 (concluding that, in the context of 
congressional enforcement of rights that receive intermediate scrutiny, the 
congruence and proportionality standard requires an assessment of fit, but 
suggesting that such an assessment lacks clear standards). 
 271. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010) (plurality 
opinion) (arguing for the use of the Due Process Clause in analyzing Fourteenth 
Amendment protections of state infringement of Second Amendment rights); id. 
at 805–06 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
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Boerne, the Court has decided four cases involving federal 
legislation defended as enforcing Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights.272 In reverse chronological order, those cases are 
Georgia,273 Lane,274 Florida Prepaid,275 and Boerne276 itself.  
1. Georgia 
The most recent of these cases, United States v. Georgia,277 
can be dispensed with quickly. In Georgia, the Court 
unanimously agreed that, whatever else Congress might be able 
to accomplish through the enforcement power, it unquestionably 
could legislate judicial remedies for state conduct that actually 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In a sense, that holding is 
trivial.278 Particularly in the Second Amendment context, a 
holding that Congress has the power to legislate remedies for 
judicially-found constitutional violations says very little about the 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a more appropriate 
authority to protect Second Amendment rights).  
 272. See infra Part IV.A.1–3 (examining the cases and their implications). 
 273. See infra note 277 (discussing Georgia).  
 274. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Lane).  
 275. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing Florida Prepaid). 
 276. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing Boerne).  
 277. 546 U.S. 151 (2006). For details on the case, see supra note 153 and 
accompanying text (discussing whether the ADA’s provision of money damages 
for violations of the public services provision constituted appropriate 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when applied 
to conduct that was alleged to have violated the Due Process Clause). 
 278. Indeed, it is telling that the Court was unanimous in Georgia, despite 
having split badly on every other enforcement power case after Boerne. See id. 
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope 
of Congress’s ‘prophylactic’ enforcement powers under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress 
the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amendment by 
creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of 
those provisions.  
(citations omitted). It may also be telling that the Court’s brief opinion 
upholding this use of the enforcement power was written by Justice Scalia, who 
by 2006 had gone on record as taking the most restrictive view of that power of 
all the justices. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (repudiating the congruence and proportionality test and, with the 
exception of racial equality legislation, limiting Congress to enacting remedies 
for actual judicially-decreed Fourteenth Amendment violations). 
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potential scope of congressional power, given the vagueness and 
uncertainty of current Second Amendment doctrine. That 
vagueness and uncertainty potentially opens up significant room 
for congressional participation in the project of vindicating 
Second Amendment rights—but only if we can conclude both that 
that vagueness reflects courts’ institutional competence-derived 
hesitancy in stating clearer rules and that Congress possesses the 
expertise or authority to provider clearer guidance. 
That uncertainty—and hence, the potential for more robust 
congressional power—arises most explicitly in the context of gun 
regulations that implicate something other than the core Heller 
right to law-abiding citizens’ self-defense in the home via the use 
of weapons commonly employed for that purpose. As Part III 
noted, regulations going beyond that narrow description trigger 
judicial scrutiny that potentially involves a sequence of varied 
analytical approaches.279 As it also noted, some of those 
approaches may be resistant to meaningful congressional 
input.280 Others, however, implicate empirical data and policy 
analysis that might well benefit from the input Congress is 
well-suited to provide.281 Indeed, to the extent that sequence of 
analysis ultimately ends with a seemingly ad hoc reweighing of 
the costs and benefits of regulation under the guise of 
intermediate scrutiny, congressional input could be particularly 
useful.  
2. Lane 
The remaining due process cases go beyond Georgia’s 
minimalist endorsement of enforcement legislation that simply 
provides remedies for judge-found constitutional violations.282 
                                                                                                     
 279. See supra Part III (reviewing the analytical approaches). 
 280. See supra Part III (explaining how some of these approaches may not 
be amenable to congressional input). 
 281. Cf. Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 184–92 (1997) (arguing that 
Congress is institutionally well-suited to contribute to the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions to the extent that interpretation rests on empirical or 
policy judgments). 
 282. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (“But just as Georgia states 
an unremarkable proposition of Enforcement Clause doctrine, it adds little to 
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These cases pose the question whether one can apply the 
congruence and proportionality test in a way that allows a 
meaningful role for Congress to enact prophylactic rules of 
conduct while respecting Boerne’s insistence on judicial 
superiority in stating constitutional meaning.283 
The first logical candidate for this inquiry is Lane.284 Most of 
Lane is devoted to presenting evidence of state deprivations of the 
particular right at issue—the right of disabled persons to access 
the judicial process285—and defending its decision to evaluate the 
ADA’s public services provision as applied to that particular 
right.286 But for our purposes its most helpful component is its 
comparison of the ADA (as applied to the courthouse access right) 
with the doctrinal test that the Court uses to decide claims of 
unconstitutional denial of that access.287 In performing that 
comparison, the Court noted the similarity between the ADA’s 
“reasonable accommodation” requirement and the underlying 
constitutional doctrine’s requirement that, “‘within the limits of 
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.”288 After considering 
applications of that constitutional standard,289 it concluded that, 
just as with the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement, 
“[e]ach of [those constitutional] cases makes clear that ordinary 
                                                                                                     
the far more nuanced issues discussed in other post-Boerne cases.”). 
 283. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (stating that the 
RFRA “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers 
and the federal balance” and that the Court’s precedent must control). 
 284. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 (applying the congruence and proportionality 
test).  
 285. See id. at 527 (“With respect to the particular services at issue in this 
case, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across the 
country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason 
of their disabilities.”). 
 286. See id. at 531 (“Congress’[s] chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion 
and discrimination described above . . . is congruent and proportional to its 
object of enforcing the right of access to the courts.”). 
 287. See id. at 532 (“[The ADA’s] duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent 
with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within the limits of 
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard’ in its courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 288. Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
 289. See id. at 532–33 (examining cases in which the constitutional standard 
has been applied). 
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considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a 
State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of 
access to the courts.”290 Thus, the Court concluded:  
Judged against this backdrop, [the ADA’s] affirmative 
obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the 
administration of justice cannot be said to be so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior. It is, rather, a reasonable 
prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate 
end.291 
Applying this approach292 to the Second Amendment is 
helpful only to the extent that Second Amendment doctrine can 
be stated in a sufficiently clear and determinate way that it 
provides the same kind of clear reference point for congruence 
and proportionality analysis that the doctrinal test for judicial 
access rights provided in Lane.293 Unfortunately, Second 
Amendment doctrine is not that straightforward.294 As Part III 
explained, Second Amendment cases often require a sequence of 
analytical steps featuring different methodologies.295 To make 
                                                                                                     
 290. Id. at 533.  
 291. Id. (footnote, citations, and internal quotations omitted).  
 292. For the sake of clarity, note that Lane’s approach is similar to, but 
nevertheless distinct from, the tiered scrutiny approach associated with the 
post-Boerne Court’s equal protection-based enforcement power doctrine, 
discussed in the prior section of this Article. See supra Part IV (discussing 
examples of the tiered scrutiny approach in Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs). The 
tiered scrutiny approach focuses on the three tiers of judicial equal protection 
scrutiny—rationality, intermediate, and strict—and how those tiers can inform 
Enforcement Clause questions. By contrast, Lane’s approach focuses on the 
particular doctrinal test governing the underlying constitutional right that the 
enforcement legislation seeks to vindicate. Such a doctrinal test could 
conceivably be expressed as one of the tiered scrutiny levels normally associated 
with equal protection, or it could be a completely sui generis test, as in Lane 
itself. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004) (describing the judicial 
test for evaluating infringements on the right to access the court system). 
 293. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (establishing that Congress’s objective of 
enforcing the right of access to courts is congruent and proportional to 
Congress’s remedy for violations of that objective). 
 294. See supra notes 246–256 and accompanying text (discussing these 
methodologies for examining congruence and proportionality in the Second 
Amendment context). 
 295. See supra notes 246–256 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
range in the methodological approaches can make a court’s examination more 
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matters worse, many Second Amendment cases end with an 
application of a hazy balancing of the gun possession right with 
the government’s interest, often labeled “intermediate 
scrutiny.”296 To be sure, this characterization of Second 
Amendment doctrine is not necessarily a criticism; there may be 
good reasons for both courts’ multi-step/methodologically-varied 
approach and the intermediate scrutiny that often constitutes its 
last step. But both components of this description make it 
conceptually difficult—if not all-but impossible—to simply do 
what Lane did: place the challenged enforcement statute 
alongside the judicial doctrine governing the underlying 
constitutional right, and determine whether the first is 
sufficiently similar to the second that one can pronounce the 
congruence and proportionality test either satisfied or unmet.297 
The ambivalent state of Second Amendment doctrine thus 
suggests that courts will often lack clear doctrinal guideposts for 
performing congruence and proportionality review of gun rights 
legislation. This is not always the case: if nothing else, Heller’s 
identification of a core Second Amendment right strongly 
suggests that enforcement legislation directly vindicating that 
core right should receive a favorable judicial reception. But even 
this statement requires qualification: for example, query whether 
a court would accord such a favorable reception to an enforcement 
statute that removed what courts might consider a trivial burden 
on that core right.298 Leaving aside such details, the larger point 
remains: once we get past enforcement legislation vindicating 
core Second Amendment rights, congruence and proportionality 
analysis becomes murky in direct relation to the degree that 
underlying Second Amendment doctrine becomes incapable of 
either expression as a clear statement or a relatively 
straightforward application. 
                                                                                                     
difficult and complicated). 
 296. See supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text (describing as unclear 
the balancing of the right to the government’s interest). 
 297. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532–33 (comparing the ADA with the judicial 
doctrinal test). 
 298. Compare Volokh, supra note 3, at 1483–87 (suggesting that bans on 
“assault weapons” might be constitutional given the continued availability of 
similar types of weapons), with Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 181–82 (4th Cir. 
2016) (applying strict scrutiny to a state prohibition on possessing a particular 
type of weapon). 
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3. Boerne and Florida Prepaid 
The difficulties that attend congruence and proportionality 
analysis as performed in Lane—that is, analysis keyed to judicial 
doctrine governing the underlying right299—should lead us to 
consider other approaches to congruence and proportionality 
review. One alternative would have the Court focus on the factual 
support Congress amassed in favor of the enforcement statute. 
The Court took this path in Boerne300 itself, as well as in Florida 
Prepaid,301 the second Enforcement Clause case decided during 
the congruence and proportionality era.  
In Boerne, the Court focused its inquiry in part on whether 
Congress had amassed an adequate factual record demonstrating 
widespread state violations of the underlying First Amendment 
right as the Court described it—that is, the right to be free of 
government action motivated by religious bigotry.302 Examining 
the legislative record, the Court concluded that Congress had 
found little, if any, evidence of the constitutionally-prohibited 
conduct.303 Similarly, in Florida Prepaid, the Court’s primary 
objection to the federal patent rights protection law was the lack 
                                                                                                     
 299. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing Lane’s 
approach). 
 300. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (discussing the 
RFRA’s legislative record’s lack of examples of modern laws passed because of 
religious bigotry and comparing to the Voting Rights Act legislative record). 
 301. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“Unlike the . . . record of racial discrimination 
confronting Congress in the voting rights cases . . . Congress came up with little 
evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States.” (citation omitted)). 
 302. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (describing the underlying Free Exercise 
right in these terms). 
 303. See id. at 530–32 (finding no support of widespread violations of the 
Free Exercise Clause in the legislative record). To be sure, Boerne also worried 
that RFRA’s broad liability rule was simply disproportionate to the underlying 
constitutional rule as expressed in Smith. See id. at 532–35 (noting the 
disproportionality with the rule); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639  
RFRA failed to meet [the congruence and proportionality] test 
because there was little support in the record for the concerns that 
supposedly animated the law. And . . . RFRA’s provisions were so out 
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that RFRA 
could not be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior. 
(citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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of a factual record of widespread state conduct depriving patent 
holders’ property rights without due process.304 
This focus on facts has the benefit of redirecting the Court’s 
attention away from examining how closely a challenged 
enforcement statute tracks the judicial doctrine governing the 
underlying right Congress seeks to vindicate. Thus, it promises to 
avoid, or at least reduce, the problem that arises when Congress 
seeks to enforce a right that is governed by either an 
indeterminate doctrinal test such as intermediate scrutiny305 or 
an intricate doctrinal structure that makes such a comparison 
highly complex,306 both of which characterize Second Amendment 
doctrine. It also promises to focus the Court’s attention where, as 
an institutional matter, Congress can perhaps play a particularly 
helpful role: the finding of broad social facts that bear on the 
extent to which a judicially-recognized right is being violated.307 
Unfortunately, this approach to enforcement power review, 
just like the approach in Lane, is viable only if the underlying 
constitutional rights doctrine is reasonably clear. The Boerne 
Court had in front of it a constitutional right—the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise right—that, as the Court explained 
                                                                                                     
 304. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (“In enacting the Patent Remedy 
Act . . . Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let 
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); id. at 642 (“Though patents may 
be considered ‘property’ for purposes of our analysis, the legislative record still 
provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to remedy a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act.”); id. at 
645 (“The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not 
respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional 
rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 
legislation.”). 
 305. See supra notes 265–270 and accompanying text (reviewing examples of 
intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
 306. See supra Part III (discussing Second Amendment doctrine). 
 307. This optimism, however, must be tempered by the possibility that the 
resulting Second Amendment analysis may vary depending on local conditions—
for example, the possibility that the government interest side of the analysis, 
most notably its interest in crime control, may vary depending on the urban or 
rural nature of the jurisdiction in question. See Blocher, supra note 6, at 104 
(arguing that local preferences can be accommodated under Second Amendment 
doctrine); see also infra note 330 (noting that the fact-finding approach to 
Second Amendment enforcement legislation becomes more complex if one 
assumes that Second Amendment analysis legitimately accounts for local 
differences). 
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it, was sharply defined. Seven years before Boerne, in Smith, the 
Court had explicitly rejected a broader understanding of that 
right—one that found the Free Exercise Clause implicated any 
time a government action had the effect of burdening religious 
practice.308 Instead, Smith conceived of the Free Exercise right as 
one that arose only when the challenged law targeted religion 
specifically.309 That seemingly sharp definition310 allowed the 
Boerne Court to examine RFRA’s legislative record in order to 
determine whether Congress had identified examples of state 
violations of the right as thus defined.311 
The Florida Prepaid Court also had the benefit of a relatively 
well-defined constitutional right, which allowed it to search the 
legislative record for examples.312 To be sure, the violation 
                                                                                                     
 308. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 
(1990) (discussing the Sherbert test).  
 309. See id. at 872 (“[T]he Clause does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a law . . . if the law is not specifically directed to 
religious practice . . . .”). 
 310. In reality, the matter is significantly more nuanced than this. Scholars 
have argued that Smith’s rule, which the Boerne Court described in terms 
suggesting that it was a clearly-delineated, core constitutional law rule, was in 
fact partially the product of the Smith Court’s anxiety about courts’ ability to 
completely apply a broader Free Exercise right requiring courts to weigh the 
social importance of a particular regulation against the rights of believers whose 
religious conduct might be impacted by that regulation. See McConnell, supra 
note 281, at 189–92 (explaining that “the real logic of the Smith decision has to 
do with institutional roles”); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional 
Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court’s view 
that the judicial branch is “not equipped to balance religious interests against 
governmental concerns”); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 239–40 (reading 
the Smith opinion as both containing a “restrictive reading” of the right at issue 
and noting the Supreme Court’s view that the judiciary is ill-equipped to 
conduct the required analysis). Whether or not Boerne correctly described Smith 
as stating a core constitutional law rule is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Rather, this Article assumes that Boerne correctly described Smith, and 
assesses what that description means for the usefulness of Boerne’s 
fact-finding-based approach to enforcement power questions in other contexts, 
such as the Second Amendment.  
 311. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997) (conducting 
an analysis of the “RFRA’s legislative record” and noting no “modern instances 
of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry”). 
 312. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 642–46 (1999) (explaining that the legislative record identifies 
instances only of “state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the 
Constitution”). 
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targeted by the enforcement legislation at issue in Florida 
Prepaid—deprivations of patentees’ property rights without due 
process—is not one identifiable with complete clarity.313 As the 
Court has often stated, due process is a flexible concept.314 Thus, 
whether a deprivation of a patent-holder’s right was or was not 
accompanied by adequate process is not an obvious 
determination.315 Nevertheless, that determination would at least 
be focused on a discrete set of considerations.316  
In contrast to the free exercise and property rights 
contexts,317 in the Second Amendment context, the Court has 
both identified a core version of the right,318 but also strongly 
hinted that more penumbral, and thus necessarily hazier, 
versions may exist as well.319 The vaguer nature of those latter 
rights makes it harder for a court considering Second 
Amendment enforcement legislation to examine Congress’s 
factual record to determine whether it reveals violations of “the 
constitutional right.”320 Quite literally, in Second Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 313. See id. at 645 (noting that the large variety of products which the 
government purchases makes it difficult to discern “the patent status of any 
particular invention or device or product” (citing S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 10 
(1992))). 
 314. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (explaining the 
well-established principle that “due process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”). 
 315. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (explaining the complexity of 
determining when a “State’s infringement of a patent” creates “a deprivation of 
property without due process”). 
 316. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth a 
three-part test for determining when a deprivation of a liberty or property 
interest comports with due process). 
 317. See supra notes 310, 313 (noting the argument that the Free Exercise 
right as explicated in Smith was not clearly and sharply delineated and noting 
the similarly blurry boundaries of the right to be free of deprivations of property 
without due process). 
 318. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (discussing 
the “core lawful purpose of self-defense”). 
 319. See id. at 635 (explaining why the case fails to convey a clear 
understanding of the Second Amendment right in its entirety). 
 320. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (providing an 
example of a readily identifiable definition of the right at issue allowing a court 
to search the legislative record). 
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cases going beyond the Heller-identified core, it is not clear what 
exactly that “right” is.321 
There is a real irony to this conclusion. Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Heller criticized the dissenters in that case for seeking 
to muddy, through what he derided as “interest balancing,” what 
he viewed as a clear, unambiguous right.322 And indeed, if his 
analysis is sound (a question on which this Article takes no 
position), then the particular right at issue in Heller itself—the 
right of law-abiding Americans to possess, for self-defense 
purposes in the home, the type of weapon Americans prefer for 
that purpose—is a reasonably unambiguous one.323 But, as lower 
courts have discovered when trying to apply Heller to challenges 
to other types of gun restrictions, that clarity vanishes once a 
plaintiff claims a Second Amendment right that extends beyond 
the one vindicated in Heller itself.324 In turn, the doctrinal tests 
courts have employed to evaluate such claims make the gun 
possession right look less like the clearly-focused right described 
in Heller—and also less like the Free Exercise right (as Boerne 
                                                                                                     
 321. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (describing the application of the Second Amendment 
right as a “terra incognita that courts should only enter upon necessity and only 
then by small degree”).  
 322. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 
‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). 
 323. To be sure, ambiguity can creep in at any part of this formula. Is 
someone who was adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent, or a jay-walker, 
“law-abiding?” See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 458 (considering a related 
question). Is a car the equivalent of a home for a traveling salesman? See id. at 
467 (concluding that a car is not a home for the purposes of applying the Second 
Amendment). And, of course, what guns have Americans traditionally favored 
for self-defense? See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (noting that “handguns are the most 
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home”). 
Nevertheless, leaving aside these definitional questions, the core Second 
Amendment right as stated by Heller is reasonably clear, certainly as compared 
to other rights, such as the abortion right or the right to be free of a government 
taking of one’s property. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 846 (1992) (announcing and explaining the “undue” burden standard 
governing abortion rights claims); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978) (setting forth a multi-factor balancing test for 
determining when a land-use regulation constitutes a taking of property). 
 324. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (describing the uncertain nature of 
applying the Second Amendment right). 
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described it)325 and the due process property right at issue in 
Florida Prepaid.326 Therefore, the muddiness of the underlying 
Second Amendment right renders a pure record-based review of 
the type performed in Boerne and Florida Prepaid less attractive 
as a methodology for performing congruence and proportionality 
review.327 
This lack of clarity is not simply a matter of the Court’s 
refusal to clarify and expound on the Second Amendment right.328 
Even if the Court were to decide additional Second Amendment 
cases, it would need to craft a jurisprudence that recognized and 
accounted for the non-core, penumbral, nature of gun possession 
rights beyond the one asserted in Heller itself. That 
jurisprudence—whether it mirrored lower courts’ adoption of a 
multi-stage, methodologically varied inquiry, or simply applied a 
vague “intermediate scrutiny” standard—would likely not provide 
results that could be easily and predictably transferred to other 
gun possession issues.329 Thus, it seems as though Heller’s 
                                                                                                     
 325. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (noting the Boerne Court’s 
treatment of the Free Exercise right). 
 326. See supra notes 312–316 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
right to have one’s patent property taken without due process is at least 
potentially explainable in clear terms). 
 327. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (providing an example of a case in which 
the Supreme Court examined the “RFRA’s legislative record” to assist in 
resolving the issues presented). 
 328. See supra note 191 (citing the cases raising Second Amendment issues 
on which the Court has denied certiorari, despite dissenting justices’ arguments 
that the Second Amendment right needs more clarification). 
 329. For example, Eugene Volokh has observed that Heller’s “scope” 
analysis—that is, its analysis of whether a particular gun possession right came 
within the Second Amendment’s protection at all—is best understood as a 
historical inquiry. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1498 (emphasizing a lack of 
“research on the historical scope limitations on the right to bear arms”). As 
Professor Volokh points out, that sort of historical methodology means, among 
other things, that answers to particular “scope” questions cannot provide 
answers by analogy to other scope questions. See id. at 1447 (explaining the 
utility of analogies regarding the scope of constitutional rights). For example, an 
historical answer to the question of whether minors are completely 
disenfranchised from Second Amendment rights says nothing about the 
question of whether persons who are barely over the age of majority can be 
similarly disenfranchised. See id. (providing an illustrative example of an 
analogy regarding minors possessing guns). While the analogy is not precise, 
application of intermediate scrutiny to one type of gun restriction—say, 
restrictions on possessing guns on a certain type of property—would 
nevertheless similarly fail to provide definitive answers to other challenges to 
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recognition of non-core Second Amendment rights condemns the 
Court—and us—to a jurisprudence that will not provide easy 
answers to gun rights questions.330 In turn, that lack of easy 
answers will make it more difficult for Congress to amass a 
record of clear constitutional violations justifying enforcement 
legislation.331 
V. Arming the Second Amendment: A More Granular Approach 
The extant body of congruence and proportionality cases fails 
to provide adequate models for reviewing Second Amendment 
enforcement legislation.332 This reality requires that we consider 
a final alternative path. This final path abandons reliance on a 
bird’s-eye view of Second Amendment doctrine, and instead calls 
for more granular consideration of what Congress can add to the 
individual analytical steps that doctrine calls for.333 This 
approach holds the promise of rescuing congruence and 
                                                                                                     
gun restrictions because the inputs into the intermediate scrutiny inquiry would 
be different.  
 330. The fact-finding approach to Second Amendment enforcement 
legislation is further complicated if one assumes that Second Amendment 
analysis legitimately accounts for local differences that might affect aspects of 
any interest balancing or tiered scrutiny courts accord to a gun regulation. See 
Blocher, supra note 6, at 104–05 (discussing the ability of the Second 
Amendment to facilitate varying local preferences). For example, if a court 
legitimately gives more weight to a jurisdiction’s crime control justification for 
gun control than to another’s because of the first jurisdiction’s higher crime rate, 
then query whether a generally-applicable gun rights enforcement law could be 
coherently analyzed under the congruence and proportionality standard. Id. In 
such a situation, perhaps a reviewing court would be forced to perform 
congruence and proportionality review as applied to a particular plaintiff’s 
situation, including the jurisdiction in which he wished to exercise the rights 
granted by the enforcement legislation. Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 
(2004) (reviewing the congruence and proportionality of the public services 
provision of the ADA as applied to claims of courthouse access). 
 331. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (providing an 
example of a readily identifiable definition of the right at issue allowing a court 
to search the “RFRA’s legislative record” for violations of the Constitution). 
 332. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1–2 (describing “enforcement 
power scrutiny” as “analytically incoherent”). 
 333. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 892 (discussing the more 
narrowly focused, or “granular,” questions regarding Congress’s “fact-finding 
capabilities and authority”). 
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proportionality review from the dead end into which it has 
wandered—a dead end illustrated both by the Court’s ad hoc 
rejection of the enforcement legislation in Coleman and Shelby 
County,334 as well as by the Second Amendment example this 
Article has considered.335 More generally, it allows Congress a 
meaningful role in the project of vindicating Second Amendment 
rights while also respecting the Court’s insistence on its own 
supremacy in stating constitutional meaning—an insistence 
firmly imposed by a broad consensus of the Court in Boerne.336  
This proposed approach follows lower courts’ construction of 
Second Amendment doctrine based on the limited guidance Heller 
provides.337 It considers what the character of each step in that 
doctrine means for Congress’s ability to contribute to courts’ 
analysis, based on Congress’s comparative institutional 
advantages over courts.338 Thus, it allows for a congressional role 
in vindicating Second Amendment rights to the extent Congress 
is institutionally relatively well-suited to contribute to particular 
components of courts’ doctrinal analysis.339 
This approach requires a theory about what roles Congress is 
in fact comparatively well-suited to play in the project of 
vindicating constitutional rights.340 In other writing I have 
developed principles governing the types of congressional 
                                                                                                     
 334. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (stating that “the Court has 
created both analytical confusion and practical dead-ends by focusing on its 
enforcement power analysis on judicially created doctrine”). 
 335. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (explaining the problem that 
would arise if the Court applied current approaches to congruence and 
proportionality review to Second Amendment enforcement legislation). 
 336. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (noting the power to interpret is the role of 
the judiciary). 
 337. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (providing a 
definition of the Second Amendment right as “the right to keep and bear arms”). 
 338. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (discussing Congress’s ability to 
find facts). 
 339. I have elaborated on this process in more detail elsewhere. See Araiza, 
Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (explaining that “Congress is institutionally 
capable of more careful fact-finding than courts, and its political legitimacy does 
militate in favor of deference” (emphasis added)); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra 
note 22, at 235–38 (elaborating on that argument). 
 340. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 235–38 (elaborating on the 
rights defined by Congress and how that interacts with the rights defined by the 
judiciary). 
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determinations that merit particularly great or little judicial 
deference.341 Boiled down, those principles call for very little 
deference to congressional findings that shade into legal 
conclusions, moderate deference to empirical findings, and very 
great deference to findings that reflect value judgments.342 In 
reverse order, these varying levels of deference account for 
Congress’s authority to speak for the moral values of the 
American people, its fact-finding capabilities (leavened with 
proper skepticism about Congress’s incentives to use those 
capabilities effectively), and, finally, Boerne’s insistence that 
courts enjoy ultimate authority to declare constitutional 
meaning.343 
To illustrate this approach, return to the hypothetical 
enforcement legislation discussed earlier: a federal law giving 
Americans the right to carry loaded guns in their automobiles.344 
As noted earlier,345 a court considering a direct Second 
Amendment challenge to a state law restricting such carriage 
could perform as many as five distinct analytical steps.346 First, it 
would determine, using a historical analysis, whether such a 
                                                                                                     
 341. See id. at 169–93 (enumerating six principles describing the amount of 
deference courts should apply to Congress’s findings of fact in various contexts).  
 342. By “value judgments” I mean conclusions that reflect moral intuitions 
or conclusions, as distinct from objectively verifiable empirics. See Araiza, 
Deference, supra note 216, at 897–98 (describing such judgments). Such 
findings—for example, that a certain type of discrimination is fundamentally 
unfair—reflect neither empirical findings nor legal analysis. Id. While such 
findings may be quite relevant to legal issues where such value judgments 
influence the ultimate doctrinal answer (for example, in equal protection 
issues), they are less relevant in issues such as the scope of some substantive 
rights, such as the Second Amendment gun possession right. See Volokh, supra 
note 3, at 1447 (explaining the utility of analogies regarding the scope of 
constitutional rights). For simplicity, and because value judgments may play a 
lesser role in legislation enforcing the Second Amendment, this Article does not 
discuss this category. 
 343. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (noting the power 
of the judicial branch to interpret). 
 344. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (discussing the 
hypothetical and its implications). 
 345. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the five 
possible steps conducted in an analysis of the application of the Second 
Amendment). 
 346. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (reciting the five steps 
in detail). 
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right fell within the scope of the Second Amendment at all.347 
Assuming a positive answer to that question, the next step would 
be to determine whether that restriction imposed a substantial 
burden on the right.348 Assuming that the regulation did 
constitute such a burden, the third step would require a court to 
determine the proximity of that right from the core right 
identified in Heller.349 Based on that proximity, the fourth step 
would require the court to select a particular standard of review, 
while the fifth and final step would entail application of that 
review.350 
Consider the different characters of these inquiries, and 
Congress’s relative institutional capacity to contribute to their 
resolution.351 The first question—whether the right in question 
falls within the scope of the Second Amendment—is one that 
lower courts have generally tried to answer based on a 
historical/originalist analysis.352 There is no particular reason to 
believe that Congress is any better than courts at performing that 
analysis. Perhaps more importantly, to the extent such analysis 
purports to uncover the actual meaning of the constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 347. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cases 
where a historical analysis was applied to determine whether the right at issue 
is covered by the Second Amendment). 
 348. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (noting the cases 
where the question involved whether the government action imposed a 
substantial burden on the right at issue). 
 349. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (discussing 
the core aspect of the right). 
 350. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cases 
applying the concluding steps in the analysis). 
 351. As will become clear, any fact-findings or other non-legal conclusions 
that might be relevant to these doctrinal inquiries are empirical in nature. See 
ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 234–35 (noting the relative inapplicability 
of value judgments to Second Amendment enforcement legislation). For this 
reason, this Article does not further discuss the value-judgement findings 
identified earlier in the text. See supra note 342 and accompanying text 
(explaining the definition of value judgement). But see infra note 419 
(recognizing that other substantive rights may be susceptible to congressional 
enforcement via legislation reflecting such value judgments). 
 352. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (observing that a “historical 
analysis” is utilized by several courts); see also United States v. Chovan, 735 
F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a federal law prohibiting 
“domestic violence misdemeanants” from possessing weapons implicated rights 
protected by the Second Amendment, given the lack of a historical foundation 
for disarming such persons). 
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provision in question—here, the actual scope of the Second 
Amendment as understood by the framing generation—allowing 
Congress a role in answering such questions cedes to Congress 
some degree of authority in determining core constitutional 
meaning, in contravention of Boerne.353 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s 
insistence that originalist methodology reflects a vision of law as 
“the business of the courts”354 necessarily implies that Congress 
has little authority to contribute to determinations reached via 
that methodology—at least no more than other individuals or 
institutions who might be able to offer persuasive argumentation 
on the point.355  
More generally, and beyond the implications of adopting an 
originalist methodology, one might worry about allowing 
Congress a role in determining the scope of a given constitutional 
right.356 Our instincts might label such questions inherently 
legal—and, at least under one understanding of the separation of 
powers, therefore inherently judicial.357 Boerne embraced this 
                                                                                                     
 353. In this context, “core” does not refer to the Second Amendment’s 
Heller-identified home self-defense “core,” but, instead, refers more generally to 
actual constitutional meaning, rather than any construction derived from 
decisional heuristics such as tiered scrutiny review. In this sense, the notion of 
“core” constitutional meaning is closely related to Dean Sager’s identification of 
rights through a process of “analytical” reasoning, as opposed to reasoning 
derived from courts’ concerns about their institutional competence to state and 
enforce the full extent of a particular right. See supra notes 223–227 and 
accompanying text (noting the distinction between analytical reasoning and 
institutional competence reasoning in practice). 
 354. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854 (referencing the “business of the 
courts”). 
 355. Cf. Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 887–93 (discussing the proper 
weight courts should accord congressional findings based on their 
persuasiveness as opposed to Congress’s authority to make such findings). 
 356. To be sure, scholars disagree about whether such a congressional role 
violates the separation of powers or, alternatively, whether Congress enjoys at 
least some degree of authority to interpret the Constitution, subject perhaps to 
only deferential review by courts. Compare David Cole, The Value of Seeing 
Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill 
of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 59–71 (arguing in favor of such congressional 
authority), with id. at 63 n.93 (citing scholars who take the opposing position). 
 357. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1449 (describing the “scope” inquiry as one 
seeking to determine whether “the restriction is outside the terms of the right as 
set forth by the constitution” and suggesting that its answer is found by 
recourse to “the constitutional text, the original meaning, or our understanding 
of background constitutional norms”). 
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latter, judicial-supremacist, understanding.358 Given that this 
Article seeks to find a viable approach to applying Boerne’s 
standard, it takes that understanding as a background 
assumption. Consider, then, this instinct. As a rough analogy, one 
would probably not intuitively accept that Congress could enact 
legislation enforcing the First Amendment’s Speech Clause by 
determining, contra current doctrine, that as a historical matter 
obscene speech fell within the “scope” of the First Amendment’s 
free speech guarantee.359 One would think, then, that Congress 
should have little influence over this first stage of doctrinal 
analysis. 
The second inquiry courts often perform in Second 
Amendment cases considers whether a particular gun regulation 
imposes a substantial burden on the asserted right.360 While one 
might consider this primarily an empirical inquiry, on the theory 
that the substantiality of a burden can only be judged based on 
the facts,361 a moment’s reflection suggests that the matter is not 
that straightforward. The substantiality of a burden can also be 
understood as a legal standard.362 Lower courts applying this 
requirement in Second Amendment cases have implicitly 
recognized the law-intensive nature of this inquiry by analogizing 
to other constitutional rights doctrines when deciding what 
                                                                                                     
 358. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court “has had primary authority to interpret” the Constitution). 
 359. See Cole, supra note 356, at 54–55 (making a similar suggestion); 
Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (drawing a similar comparison when 
considering how to apply the “scope” step of Second Amendment analysis). 
 360. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Rather, heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions 
that . . . operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to 
possess and use a firearm for self defense . . . .”); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 
786 (9th Cir. 2011) (inquiring into the substantiality of the burden imposed by a 
challenged gun regulation). 
 361. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1458 (arguing that a particular sub-part of 
the substantiality inquiry requires “an inquiry into the functional magnitude of 
the restriction” on the constitutional right); id. at 1460 (“Estimating the burden 
[a particular gun restriction places] on self-defense will require considering how 
a particular hypothetical defense scenario is likely to play out under different 
regulatory schemes . . . .”). 
 362. See, e.g., Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167–68 (analogizing the “substantial 
burden” inquiry in Second Amendment cases to those in abortion, takings, and 
right to marry cases); see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (noting 
analogous inquiries in other constitutional rights areas). 
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constitutes a “substantial burden.”363 Indeed, when one 
remembers that the linchpin of the right to abortion is whether 
the challenged abortion restriction imposes a “substantial 
obstacle,”364 one realizes the potentially outcome determinative 
nature of a congressional conclusion about substantiality.365 
Given its potential significance, a conclusive determination by 
Congress that a given gun regulation constitutes a substantial 
impairment could conceivably amount to a statement of 
constitutional meaning, with serious implications for Boerne’s 
insistence that courts maintain the ultimate authority over such 
statements.366 
To be sure, this is not to suggest that federal enforcement 
legislation has nothing to say about the substantiality question, 
or that a court would be justified in ignoring congressional 
findings that speak to the substantiality of the burden imposed 
by a particular gun regulation.367 It’s obviously true that even the 
                                                                                                     
 363. See Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167–68 (referring to the “substantial burden” 
in the constitutional areas of abortions, takings, and the right to marry); see also 
Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (discussing the “substantial burden” inquiry in 
different constitutional doctrine cases). 
 364. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) 
(“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its 
purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”). 
 365. See id. (explaining that a “substantial obstacle” prohibition “protect[s] 
the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the 
State’s profound interest in potential life”).  
 366. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (explaining that 
the exercise of “the interpretive power” is the judicial branch’s responsibility). 
 367. Indeed, it may be that the conclusions about the substantiality of the 
burden are different in the abortion and gun rights contexts. In particular, a 
conclusion that a law places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion is an ultimate legal conclusion about the constitutionality of 
such a law, while a conclusion that a gun restriction “substantially burdens” a 
Second Amendment-protected right merely allows the plaintiff’s challenge to 
advance to the next stage of analysis. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“A 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”), with, e.g., Heller v. 
District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that a 
finding that a restriction constitutes a substantial burden on the core Second 
Amendment right triggers a heavier burden of persuasion on the government at 
the subsequent stages of analysis). Thus, one might argue that a gun rights 
enforcement statute denominating a particular type of a regulation as a 
“substantial burden” on Second Amendment rights does not threaten the Court’s 
ARMING THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1875 
most inherently legal issues embed significant factual or 
empirical components. To the extent that findings from Congress 
help create the empirical context for the court’s ultimate 
judgment on the substantiality question, those findings merit 
some degree of judicial respect. By the same token, however, to 
the extent such findings conclusively answer the substantial 
burden question, judicial control over constitutional meaning 
requires that such deference cannot be absolute.  
The third inquiry requires courts to determine how far the 
right at issue lies from the Heller-identified core of the Second 
Amendment.368 Making this proximity determination constitutes 
a delicate business. How is one to determine “how far” a 
                                                                                                     
authoritative role in stating constitutional meaning to the same degree as a 
federal law denominating a particular type of abortion restriction as a 
“substantial obstacle.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. See also Araiza, Deference, supra 
note 216, at 910–13 (counseling very little judicial deference to congressional 
fact-findings that essentially state legal conclusions). Nevertheless, a 
congressional finding on the question of whether a particular gun restriction 
constitutes a “substantial burden” on Second Amendment rights does have 
significant legal impact: an affirmative finding on that question allows the 
Second Amendment analysis to continue, while a negative finding on that 
question stops the analysis. See, e.g., ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 912 
(explaining the implications of congressional fact-findings in a related context). 
 368. See, e.g., Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that “laws 
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment 
right . . . may be more easily justified” than those that impose “a severe burden 
on the core Second Amendment right”); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 
1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (following Ezell I’s approach). While at first glance this 
inquiry might seem quite similar to the question of the substantiality of the 
burden, courts have distinguished the two. Id. For example, in Chovan, the 
Ninth Circuit recognized that a federal law prohibiting domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing guns did not implicate the core Second 
Amendment right of law-abiding citizens to possess guns for home self-defense. 
See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (stating that the Second Amendment right in 
Heller does not apply to non-law-abiding citizens). Nevertheless, it 
acknowledged that the law’s permanent prohibition on gun possession 
constituted a substantial burden on the relevant Second Amendment right—
recognizing that that right lay at some distance from the core right the 
Amendment recognizes. See id. at 1138 (stating that the regulation in question 
“does not implicate the core Second Amendment right, but it does place a 
substantial burden on the right”). Together, these second and third inquiries 
establish the seriousness of the infringement on the right: the second considers 
the weight (or “substantiality”) of the infringement, while the third considers 
the constitutional centrality of the right suffering the infringement. See 
generally supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the five 
possible steps conducted in an analysis of Second Amendment application). 
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particular gun right lies from the Heller-identified core?369 This is 
a highly conceptual question, given the inability to express 
concretely the distance between a penumbral and a core right. 
Certainly, it is not a question that can be described as 
unambiguously empirical. Indeed, the entire idea of 
denominating rights as “core” and “peripheral” (and thus the 
process of measuring the distance between such rights) seems to 
be a legal enterprise, analogous in character to the identification 
of something as a right to begin with.370 To the extent congruence 
and proportionality review requires that the ultimate power to 
state constitutional meaning remains lodged with courts, the 
ultimate proximity determination, just like the ultimate 
determination about the existence of a right, must remain with 
courts.371 
Nevertheless, Heller introduces notes of ambiguity into this 
analysis.372 That ambiguity again highlights our earlier insight 
that even legal questions trigger factual inquiries that are 
susceptible to meaningful congressional input.373 Recall Justice 
Scalia’s statement, when explaining his description of the core 
Second Amendment right, that self-defense needs are “most 
acute” in the home.374 To the extent he was providing an 
explanation for why the Second Amendment right was originally 
thought to be most pressing in the home, that statement simply 
provides an explanatory backdrop for his discovery, through legal 
(originalist) analysis, of a particular right.375 By contrast, if the 
                                                                                                     
 369. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (holding 
that the “core lawful purpose” of firearm possession is “self-defense”). 
 370. Compare, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 
(2009) (“[R]eferences to excretory and sexual material surely lie at the periphery 
of First Amendment concern.” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
743 (1978))), with Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[S]peech on 
public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values . . . .” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983))).  
 371. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (noting the interpretive role of the courts). 
 372. See infra notes 373–376 and accompanying text (explaining the 
ambiguity). 
 373. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s 
“fact-finding capabilities and authority”). 
 374. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (describing the home as “the place where the 
importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute”). 
 375. Id.  
ARMING THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1877 
right itself is a more general right of self-defense, with Justice 
Scalia explaining that that right is “most acute” in the home 
because empirically that’s where the right is most important, 
then, as with our automobile carriage example, Congress might 
have a role in delineating its scope—for example, by finding that 
automobile travel exposes Americans to an unusually high risk of 
crime.376 
The difference between these characterizations tracks the 
difference, explained above,377 between legal conclusions and 
findings of fact (including broad social facts), and the different 
levels of deference appropriate for these distinct types of 
congressional conclusions.378 As suggested by our analysis of 
Second Amendment doctrinal steps so far, Congress should enjoy 
a more robust role in vindicating rights—including Second 
Amendment rights—when it finds such facts, rather than when it 
offers legal conclusions that more directly influence the contour of 
the underlying right.379  
The distinction between the leeway Congress enjoys when it 
finds empirical facts bearing on the importance of the right at 
issue, and when instead Congress simply decrees that a certain 
right exists or is of a particular importance, becomes even 
sharper when one moves to the fourth and fifth inquiries: 
respectively, the identification and then application of the 
appropriate scrutiny standard.380 Both of these determinations 
                                                                                                     
 376. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 905–26 (explaining the 
distinction between congressional findings of empirical fact and findings that 
constitute legal conclusions). 
 377. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (explaining and defining 
value judgements). 
 378. Cf. Post, supra note 13, at 80 (noting that the Court’s characterization 
of libraries in [United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 235–36 
(2003)] was integral to the justices’ conflicting conclusions about the First 
Amendment claim in that case, but that such characterizations require an 
understanding of society’s view of libraries and their appropriate role in society). 
 379. This tentative lesson requires the caveat that a doctrinal focus on local 
facts may necessarily limit the relevance of more generally-applicable facts 
supporting enforcement legislation. See Blocher, supra note 6, at 135–36 
(discussing the ability of the Second Amendment to facilitate varying local 
preferences). 
 380. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the 
possible steps involved in an analysis of Second Amendment applications). 
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involve evaluating facts against a legal standard.381 The 
identification of the appropriate standard of review requires a 
judge to determine what the results of the second and third steps 
noted above (respectively, the substantiality of the burden and 
the proximity of the impacted gun right to Heller’s core)382 mean 
for how stringently the gun restriction should be reviewed.383 
Similarly, application of that standard requires the judge to 
evaluate the importance of the asserted government interest, and 
how well-tailored the challenged law is to vindicating that 
interest.384  
At first blush, the nature of these final two determinations 
suggests Congress’s comparatively smaller role in influencing 
them via enforcement legislation.385 If the Court insists (as it has 
since Boerne) that it enjoys ultimate supremacy over the meaning 
of the Constitution, then it must have the final say over 
evaluative judgments of the sort made in these final two 
analytical steps.386 Those judgments—for example, that strict 
scrutiny is called for in a particular gun rights case, or that a 
given gun restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
withstand such scrutiny—are fundamentally legal in character, 
even if they require an understanding of the background empirics 
of a given issue.387 
                                                                                                     
 381. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the 
possible steps involved in an analysis of Second Amendment applications). 
 382. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (noting the 
lower court’s Second Amendment analysis involving two steps). 
 383. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (describing the five 
potential steps conducted in a Second Amendment analysis). 
 384. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 181–82 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that 
strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review for the Second Amendment 
claim at issue). 
 385. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (providing 
explanations of the five possible analytical steps for applications of the Second 
Amendment and the role of courts in each step). 
 386. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (noting that the 
power to interpret is the role of the judiciary). 
 387. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) 
(refusing to defer to an asserted congressional finding that a particular 
content-based speech restriction was the only effective way of protecting minors, 
on the ground that “while we do not ignore [that finding], it is our task in the 
end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution”). 
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At the very least, as a practical matter such judgments often 
come close to dictating the result in a given case. For example, a 
determination that a given gun restriction triggers strict scrutiny 
makes it quite likely that the restriction will be struck down, a 
reality reflected by the expression “strict in theory, fatal in 
fact.”388 Conversely, a determination that a given restriction is 
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest all-but 
decides an individual rights case in favor of the government.389 If 
Congress enjoyed a large role in making those determinations, it 
would essentially be dictating the results of constitutional 
cases.390 Indeed, on one reading such congressional declarations 
would dictate not just results, but the outcome of a reasoning 
process that is understood to be the particular province of 
courts.391 Whatever the merits of an argument that Congress 
should enjoy that power, or should at least enjoy significant 
deference when it makes such determinations,392 this result is 
impossible—or at least quite difficult—to square with Boerne.393 
                                                                                                     
 388. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term—Foreward: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 389. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 129 (providing an example of a case where the 
Court suggested that deferring to a congressional judgment about the outcome 
of strict scrutiny review would effectively allow Congress to determine whether 
its own law violated the Constitution). 
 390. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (explaining that the interpretive function, 
specifically of the Constitution, is the role of the judicial branch). 
 391. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 58 (“Whether a classification serves a 
‘compelling’ governmental interest or is ‘narrowly tailored’ are questions that 
must be answered primarily by reference to the legal precedents of the Court.”). 
 392. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 356 (arguing for such deference). 
 393. To be sure, if one reads Boerne narrowly, as responding to a statute 
(RFRA) that was unusually threatening to the judicial power, then one could 
conceivably find room for a larger, legitimate congressional role in making the 
judgments discussed in the text. For example, one could read RFRA’s explicit 
approval of the pre-Smith doctrinal rule governing free religious exercise as an 
explicit challenge to the Court’s power to determine the meaning of 
constitutional rights. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, §§ 2–3, 5–6, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb (2012)) (highlighting Congress’s RFRA finding that the doctrinal test 
set forth in pre-Smith case law constituted “a workable test for striking sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests”), invalidated by Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. On this theory, an 
enforcement statute that “merely” concluded that a given test (say, strict 
scrutiny) was satisfied might be understood as posing less serious of a challenge 
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But ambiguity creeps into these final steps as well. It is 
impossible to ignore the reality that these final two doctrinal 
determinations above involve distinct sub-inquiries. Some of 
those inquiries, to the extent they’re more heavily empirical 
rather than reflective of pure legal analysis, may merit relatively 
greater judicial receptiveness to congressional input.394 To return 
again to our hypothetical enforcement statute, a congressional 
determination that gun possession in automobiles is the only 
practical way for Americans to defend themselves against a 
serious threat to their safety would be difficult for a court to 
reject, given the respect due Congress’s empirical judgments.395 
Of course, courts—and in particular the Supreme Court—have 
shown themselves willing to privilege their own view of the 
world, even as against competing visions from Congress and state 
legislatures.396 But to say that such self-confidence (if not 
arrogance) exists in the judiciary is not to say that it is wise or 
desirable. A more humble judicial response to Congress’s 
fact-finding capability might acknowledge respect for both 
Congress’s capacity for empirical investigation and, when 
relevant to enforcement power analysis, its authority to speak for 
the values of the American people.397 The deference that would 
                                                                                                     
to the Court’s law-declaring power. An even less serious challenge might be 
detected in a statute that merely decided that a particular doctrinal test (say, 
strict scrutiny) was warranted given the facts relevant to a particular gun 
possession context. Nevertheless, even these latter two types of enforcement 
statutes would effectively dictate the outcome of constitutional cases, and as 
such, would likely encounter a serious argument that they conflicted with at 
least the spirit of Boerne.  
 394. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 906–26 (setting forth 
principles for deference determinations that depend in part on the type of fact 
for which deference is claimed). 
 395. Id. 
 396. See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, Supreme Court—October Term 
2012—Foreword: The Confident Court, 47 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 379 (2014). The 
reference in the text to state legislatures should again serve as a reminder that 
local regulatory responses to local conditions may justify their own deference, 
which might in turn limit the respect appropriately accorded congressional 
findings about national conditions more generally. See Blocher, supra note 6, at 
134 (discussing local preferences in relation to Second Amendment 
applications); supra note 330 (discussing same). The prospect of such 
jurisdiction-specific deference only increases the complexity of the deference 
calculus in the Second Amendment enforcement context. 
 397. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (arguing that 
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flow from such an acknowledgement could give Congress a 
meaningful role even in these last two steps of Second 
Amendment analysis.398 
In sum, this more granular approach to the enforcement 
power in Second Amendment cases calls for recognizing the 
distinct analytical steps that make up Second Amendment 
analysis, the extent to which each of those steps includes 
inquiries that are particularly susceptible to meaningful 
congressional input, and the nature of that input.399 Thus, it 
combines the approach taken by some post-Boerne cases, which 
keyed judicial review of enforcement legislation to the judicial 
doctrine governing the underlying right, with the approach taken 
in Florida Prepaid and Boerne itself, which considered the extent 
to which Congress had found facts relevant to the underlying 
right.400  
Both of these approaches contain kernels of truth. The first 
approach, most clearly exemplified by Lane and the 
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, reflects the post-Boerne reality that 
enforcement legislation must hew relatively closely to the Court’s 
own statement of underlying constitutional law.401 The second 
approach recognizes that Congress may find facts that are 
particularly relevant to a conclusion that states are in fact 
violating the underlying constitutional rule.402 But both of these 
approaches also suffer from flaws. The approach tying 
enforcement legislation to constitutional doctrine ignores the 
important role Congress can play in vindicating the 
                                                                                                     
congressional findings that reflect value judgments should enjoy significant 
judicial deference); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 234–35 (noting that 
value judgments may play a lesser role in legislation enforcing some substantive 
rights). 
 398. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (discussing the benefits of 
judicial deference that preserves “meaningful” congressional participation). 
 399. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 892 (explaining the 
appropriate analysis of Congress’s “fact-finding capabilities”). 
 400. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) (providing an 
example of a case where the court was able to utilize facts found by Congress to 
determine if constitutional rights were invaded). 
 401. See supra notes 141–153 and accompanying text (discussing Lane and 
the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy). 
 402. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting a “lack of support in the legislative 
record” to show findings that the constitutional right in question had been 
violated). 
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court-announced rule—a role that can become especially 
prominent when the relevant analysis turns on conclusions or 
findings Congress is best-suited to reach.403 Relatedly, it also 
ignores the reality that many constitutional rights doctrines are 
best described as a set of judicial heuristics or decision rules that 
reflect institutional competence concerns, rather than statements 
of core constitutional meaning.404 For its part, the fact-finding 
based approach to congruence and proportionality, as important 
as it is, is inadequate without a doctrinal anchor setting the 
boundaries for judicial judgments about the relevance and 
weightiness of Congress’s findings.405 Coleman and Shelby 
County demonstrate how, without such an anchor, enforcement 
power review degenerates into an ad hoc critique of Congress’s 
handiwork.406 This Article’s proposed approach combines these 
two approaches, and in doing so takes the best from each while 
avoiding each one’s distinctive shortcomings.407 
VI. Conclusion: Enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment 
The analysis so far has focused on congressional power to 
enforce the Second Amendment. But the insights gained up to 
now allow us to broaden our focus and consider the lessons this 
analysis provides for Congress’s enforcement power more 
generally. This broader inquiry is timely. The Court’s current 
                                                                                                     
 403. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (describing the 
deference which courts should give to various types of congressionally found 
facts). 
 404. See supra notes 223–227 and accompanying text (connecting this idea 
with Dean Sager’s distinction between “analytical” and “institutional” 
foundations for particular judicial statements and enforcement of rights). 
 405. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 3–4 (noting that “the Court 
apparently feels no hesitation in second-guessing quintessentially legislative 
judgements about the factual foundations or policy need for enforcement 
legislation” and that currently “no objective guideposts guide the Court’s review 
of such matters”). 
 406. See id. at 3 (noting that “[a]fter Coleman and Shelby County,” courts 
essentially have unlimited discretion regarding “how much deference to accord 
congressional judgements supporting the factual and policy bases for particular 
enforcement legislation”). 
 407. See supra notes 403–406 and accompanying text (discussing the 
problems associated with these two approaches to enforcement legislation). 
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approach to congruence and proportionality has reached a 
conceptual dead end.408 As Part II explained, after a period in 
which the nature of the enforcement power challenges reaching 
the Court allowed it to use decisional heuristics to guide its 
analysis,409 more recent enforcement power cases have left the 
Court adrift.410 In particular, the Court in Coleman and Shelby 
County essentially reweighed in an ad hoc manner the factual 
and policy judgments Congress made when enacting, 
respectively, the FMLA and the Voting Rights Act.411 Such ad hoc 
analysis leaves the Court vulnerable to the charge that it is 
simply disagreeing with those judgments, under the guise of 
finding enforcement legislation to fail the Enforcement Clause’s 
“appropriateness”412 requirement.413 The Enforcement Clause 
demands a better approach. 
A. A More Granular Enforcement Clause Jurisprudence 
The more granular analysis called for in Part V reflects such 
an alternative.414 Under this approach, the Court would apply 
                                                                                                     
 408. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (explaining that the “Court has 
created both analytical confusion and practical dead-ends by focusing its 
enforcement power analysis on judicially created doctrine, rather than core 
constitutional meaning”). 
 409. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Kimel, Garrett, 
and Hibbs). 
 410. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 3–4 (noting a lack of “objective 
guideposts to guide the Court’s review of such matters”). 
 411. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (providing a detailed 
overview of the analyses conducted in Coleman and Shelby County). 
 412. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.” (emphasis added)). 
 413. This critique is not limited to those favoring a broader enforcement 
power. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining, in similar terms, the reasons Justice Scalia was 
repudiating the congruence and proportionality test in favor of a more 
restrictive approach). 
 414. See supra Part V (rejecting a broad understanding of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence and advocating a more granular consideration of 
what Congress can add to the analytical framework of Second Amendment 
doctrine). 
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congruence and proportionality review only after carefully 
considering how Congress’s unique institutional capacities allow 
it to contribute insights to the questions judicial doctrine poses 
for evaluating the particular constitutional right at issue.415 This 
approach respects Boerne’s insistence on judicial supremacy in 
stating constitutional meaning.416 In particular, courts remain 
responsible for stating the judicial doctrine that poses the 
questions to which Congress can contribute insights in the search 
for answers.417 At the other end of the process, courts also retain 
the ultimate authority to determine whether Congress’s insights 
do in fact justify a particular answer to the given enforcement 
power question.418 But in the middle, Congress’s capacities—in 
particular, its capacities both to find empirical facts and to 
express the values of the American people419—give it a 
meaningful role, if not in stating constitutional meaning, then in 
vindicating it through legislation imposing concrete rules of 
conduct on state governments and other actors. The analysis in 
Part V exemplifies how courts could effectuate that congressional 
role.420 
                                                                                                     
 415. See supra Part V (arguing that congressional findings can help to create 
an empirical context for the court’s ultimate judgment and are, thus, due a 
degree of judicial respect). 
 416. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (stating the 
Court’s acknowledgment of its supreme authority to resolve cases and 
controversies). 
 417. This approach avoids the enforcement power review becoming an ad 
hoc critique of congressional action as occurred in Coleman and Shelby County. 
See generally Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 418. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–27 (presenting the Court’s history of ruling 
on Congress’s use of the enforcement power in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 419. The fact that some substantive rights areas may not be susceptible to 
enforcement legislation grounded in Congress’s claims to be instantiating 
Americans’ value judgments, see supra note 351 and accompanying text, does 
not mean that such judgments are irrelevant to all enforcement legislation 
enforcing substantive rights. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 236 
(suggesting one substantive rights area where value judgments may in fact 
support enforcement legislation). 
 420. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–27 (explaining that the Enforcement 
Clause limits Congress to a remedial role rather than a role in defining 
Fourteenth Amendment rights).  
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Can this new congressional role be squared with the concept 
of congruence and proportionality review? At one level, that 
formula presents itself, literally, as a classic proportionality test. 
So understood, one can perhaps understand why the Court in the 
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, and even in Lane, relied so heavily 
on the degree to which the challenged enforcement legislation 
tracked the importance or centrality of the underlying 
constitutional right that legislation sought to enforce.421 The 
more granular approach this Article proposes requires a more 
nuanced understanding of the concepts of “congruence” and 
“proportionality.”422 As it has made clear, the proposed approach 
to congruence and proportionality requires a far more intricate 
analysis than the application of a simple thumb on the scale 
favoring or disfavoring enforcement legislation based on the 
importance or centrality of the underlying right Congress seeks to 
enforce,423 or even a simple comparison of the rules of conduct 
laid down by the Constitution and the enforcement statute in 
question.424 Rather, this understanding would require courts to 
think about “congruence” and “proportionality” in a more holistic 
way, by considering the degree to which enforcement legislation, 
and especially the congressional findings underlying it, help 
answer the questions posed by courts’ constitutional doctrine.425  
                                                                                                     
 421. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532–33 (2004) (noting how 
analogous the Americans with Disabilities Act’s “reasonable accommodation” 
requirement was to the underlying constitutional law rule); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“The FMLA aims to protect the 
right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”); Bd. of Trs. 
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (beginning its inquiry 
with the limitations placed upon the states in their treatment of the disabled by 
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 422. See supra Part V (treating congruence and proportionality review as 
embedding fact and policy inquiries). 
 423. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (engaging in a skeptical review of 
legislation enforcing the equal protection rights of disabled persons); Hibbs, 538 
U.S. at 721 (engaging in a more relaxed review of legislation enforcing the equal 
protection rights of women). 
 424. See supra Part IV (referencing how Lane plotted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement against the 
underlying constitutional rule). 
 425. See supra Part V (suggesting a fix for the wrong-turn in congruence and 
proportionality review that has led to arguably ad hoc review of enforcement 
legislation).  
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Under this approach, an enforcement statute would be 
congruent and proportional if it enacted a substantive rule of 
conduct reflecting the relevant core constitutional law, as 
supported by appropriate congressional determinations.426 For 
example, the employment provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act—the provisions struck down in Garrett—would 
have been upheld to the extent Congress had demonstrated that 
employment discrimination against the disabled was largely 
marked by either irrationality or animus, the core rules 
governing the equal protection guarantee.427 Similarly, the 
self-care leave provision of the FMLA—the provision struck down 
in Coleman—would have been upheld if Congress had 
demonstrated that that provision targeted the same phenomenon 
that persuaded the Court to uphold the FMLA’s family-care leave 
provision, namely, employers’ perceptions about women’s relative 
undesirability as employees given their presumed domestic 
responsibilities.428 Note that the defenders of the self-care leave 
provision did in fact make this argument in Coleman; however, 
the plurality rejected it as “overly complicated” and 
“unconvincing.”429 Under this Article’s approach, congressional 
                                                                                                     
 426. See supra Part V (applying this approach to the hypothetical law giving 
Americans the right to carry loaded firearms in their cars). 
 427. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The 
Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 275 
(2011)  
The baseline of the American constitutional order is a government 
that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has reasons 
for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant 
that government’s actions are undertaken in good faith and for 
reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate. 
 428. Of course, the personal-care provision targeted that phenomenon 
indirectly, by providing personal-care leave in order to neutralize the effect of 
the assumption that women would be the primary users of FMLA family-care 
leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012). As noted earlier in the discussion of Coleman, see 
supra notes 156–170 and accompanying text, defenders of the personal-care 
provision noted that Congress concluded that employers perceived family-care 
leave as a woman’s benefit that rendered women less desirable as employees. 
Thus, the argument made by the plaintiffs was that the provision of family-care 
leave encouraged additional sex discrimination that would be mitigated by the 
provision of personal-care leave. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 
U.S. 30, 39 (2012) (discussing the mitigating inclusion of personal-care leave). 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon itself is similar, with the only difference being 
the directness with which the statute targeted the constitutional wrong. 
 429. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 40 (“Petitioner’s overly complicated argument 
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findings about social reality430—here, employer perceptions and 
likely reactions to the provision of family-care leave—should have 
enjoyed a level of deference the Coleman plurality did not 
accord.431 
Other congressional determinations might merit less weight 
in the enforcement power calculus. For example, as this Article 
has argued throughout, judicial decisions that have the status of 
statements of core constitutional meaning are not appropriately 
subject to supplementation by Congress.432 To take a Second 
Amendment example, an enforcement statute that declared that 
the core of the Second Amendment includes the right of public 
carriage of a firearm would contradict Heller’s identification of 
the home as the locus for the core Second Amendment right.433 Of 
course, Heller did not rule out Second Amendment protection for 
gun possession outside the home.434 As this Article has also 
suggested, Congress could play a valid and useful role in enacting 
enforcement legislation that applies the relevant judicial doctrine 
to facts that Congress is particularly well-suited to find, 
especially when that doctrine extends beyond its core 
application.435 But statements of core constitutional meaning—
what Dean Sager identifies as “analytically-[derived]” 
                                                                                                     
about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the family-care 
provision is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the clear 
requirements of City of Boerne.”). 
 430. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (acknowledging 
Congress’s unique understanding of social reality and arguing that courts ought 
to defer to congressional determinations based on such understanding). 
 431. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 40 (“Petitioner’s overly complicated argument 
about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the family-care 
provisions is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the clear 
requirements of City of Boerne.”). 
 432. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“The power to 
interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”). 
 433. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“The 
prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.”). 
 434. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(stating that Heller’s designation of the home as the place where the need for 
defense is most acute “suggest[s] that some form of the right applies where that 
need is not ‘most acute’”). 
 435. See supra Part V (labeling Congress’s fact-finding ability a unique 
institutional capability). 
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constitutional interpretations—remain immune from 
congressional countermanding via enforcement legislation.436  
These quick examples illustrate the complexity of the 
approach this Article suggests. It requires the Court to 
distinguish between its statements of core constitutional meaning 
and mere decisional heuristics such as equal protection tiered 
scrutiny analysis.437 It thus requires the Court to understand 
which congressional determinations shade over into conclusions 
about the content of constitutional law, which Boerne insists 
remain the ultimate province of the judiciary.438 But at the same 
time this approach obliges the court to be sensitive to the types of 
determinations Congress is best-suited to make, and how those 
determinations help answer the questions the Court’s doctrine 
demands be answered.439  
B. Challenges 
These inquiries are sensitive and difficult. But this more 
nuanced understanding of congruence and proportionality, even if 
difficult and challenging to apply, is necessary.  
1. The Challenge of Variety 
It is necessary, first, because of the great diversity of 
doctrinal tests governing substantive rights protected by the Due 
Process Clause. In a world in which the subject-matter of 
enforcement legislation migrates beyond equal protection group 
rights and toward the substantive rights protected by the Due 
                                                                                                     
 436. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1241 (“[I]t is appropriate for the Supreme 
Court to overturn a congressional enactment under [§] 5 if it finds that the 
enactment cannot be justified by any analytically defensible conception of the 
relevant constitutional concept.”). 
 437. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 50–83 (explaining tiered 
scrutiny). 
 438. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524 (stating the supreme authority of the 
judiciary to sit and decide cases and controversies as delegated in Article III of 
the United States Constitution). 
 439. See supra Part V (discussing the benefits of Congress’s institutional 
capacities and advocating for the courts’ utilization of these capacities of 
Congress in judicial analysis). 
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Process Clause,440 a simple proportionality inquiry, guided by a 
straightforward decisional heuristic such as tiered scrutiny, is 
inadequate to the task.441 Substantive constitutional rights 
doctrine is strikingly diverse. Every Bill of Rights provision that 
has been incorporated (and that therefore is susceptible to 
congressional enforcement) brings with it its own doctrinal 
structure.442 Sometimes those doctrines will share elements,443 
while some inquiries will be sui generis to that particular right.444 
That variety necessarily renders congruence and proportionality 
review similarly variegated—at least if that review aspires to be 
a credible evaluation of enforcement legislation that both respects 
Congress’s admittedly broad authority to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment but also recognizes the Court’s insistence on its 
ultimate authority to state constitutional meaning.  
2. The Challenge of Complexity 
Even within the realm of any given constitutional right, the 
internal complexity of many constitutional rights doctrines poses 
a serious challenge to congruence and proportionality review. The 
Second Amendment example this Article has explored reveals 
how intricate any given doctrine may be.445 There is no reason to 
believe that the Second Amendment is unique. For example, free 
speech doctrine is remarkably complex, and has only grown more 
                                                                                                     
 440. For example, in addition to gun rights, it is possible to envision 
enforcement legislation that targets controversial local police practices and local 
and state takings of property. 
 441. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 228–32 (noting and describing the 
various doctrinal tests courts apply to different Bill of Rights provisions). 
 442. See id. (stating the applicable test for each amendment of the Bill of 
Rights). 
 443. See id. at 236 (noting common approaches across several different areas 
of fundamental rights doctrine); see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1460–61 
(noting that adjudications of substantive rights claims often include an inquiry 
into the substantiality of the burden that the challenged law imposes on the 
claimed right). 
 444. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 231–32 (discussing the possibility of the 
Eighth Amendment as sui generis). 
 445. See supra Part III.B (considering how the variant doctrinal approaches 
in Second Amendment jurisprudence would complicate a court’s congruence and 
proportionality review). 
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so in recent years with innovations such as the government 
speech doctrine.446 Fourth Amendment doctrine is riddled with 
exceptions.447 Establishment Clause doctrine has long been 
criticized for drawing fine distinctions that seem to lack 
principled bases.448  
This complexity necessarily translates into Enforcement 
Clause inquiries, given Boerne’s insistence that enforcement 
legislation meaningfully relate to the court-announced meaning 
of the underlying right Congress seeks to vindicate.449 Indeed, 
applying the congruence and proportionality standard to 
legislation enforcing such rights will enmesh courts in even more 
daunting challenges, as that standard will require application of 
an imprecise proportionality test to doctrine that is already 
difficult to apply.  
                                                                                                     
 446. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and 
correspondingly imprecise.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the government speech doctrine 
as “recently minted”). 
 447. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 27, 45 (2008) (discussing the search incident to a lawful arrest 
doctrine and asking readers to “[c]ompare this to the rest of Fourth Amendment 
law, which is riddled with exceptions, caveats, and uncertainty”). 
 448. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110–11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) 
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography 
textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but the State may 
not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State 
may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend 
a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history 
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend 
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus 
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation 
to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the 
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a 
field trip. 
(citations omitted). 
 449. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (creating the 
congruency and proportionality standard for § 5 enforcement). 
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3. The Challenge of Methodology 
Yet the challenge is even more difficult than that. As the 
Second Amendment example has illustrated, different 
components of particular individual rights doctrines stand in 
different relations to the Constitution.450 To originalists, the 
original understanding of the Constitution constitutes pure 
constitutional law—that is, the core meaning of the relevant 
constitutional text, unmediated by decisional heuristics or 
indirect sources of meaning.451 Other components—for example, 
equal protection’s tiered scrutiny structure—are best understood 
as such heuristics.452 Still other components—for example, 
empirical inputs into determinations that go into the application 
of tests such as strict or intermediate scrutiny—are not 
themselves law, even if those inputs (for example, a finding that 
no other policy alternative furthers the government’s goal as 
effectively)453 all-but determine the outcome of the constitutional 
issue at hand. If the Court wishes to apply congruence and 
proportionality in a way that respects Congress’s legitimate role 
in vindicating constitutional meaning, then it will have to 
determine the constitutional status of each component of the 
underlying constitutional rights doctrine at issue in order to 
decide how much of a role Congress has in enforcing that 
component.454 The Second Amendment example this Article has 
examined illustrates this difficulty, given the different 
                                                                                                     
 450. See supra Part III (noting the methodological variety of the various 
analytical steps in Second Amendment doctrine). 
 451. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1189 (discussing originalism as 
“regard[ing] the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its 
initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in 
the present” (citation omitted)). 
 452. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716 (2013) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges 
determine when classifications have that ‘fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation [required by equal protection].’”). 
 453. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 227 (considering an example that 
purported to answer the narrow tailoring question posed by the relevant legal 
doctrine). 
 454. See supra Part III (noting the different constitutional statuses of 
different parts of Second Amendment caselaw.).  
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constitutional statuses of the particular analytical steps lower 
courts have undertaken when deciding gun rights cases.455 
This challenge is particularly salient in light of the rise of 
originalist analysis over the last several decades. Proponents of 
originalism often argue that one of its merits is that it seeks to 
uncover the actual law of the Constitution.456 The claim that 
originalist analysis uncovers the actual law of the Constitution, 
when combined with Boerne’s insistence that courts are the 
ultimate expositors of that law,457 necessarily means that 
doctrinal decisions grounded on originalist analysis must remain 
immune from congressional questioning or countermanding. But 
at the other end of the spectrum, doctrinal components that rest 
on empirical or social judgments, such as the effectiveness of 
alternative means for government to reach its legitimate goals, 
must presumably be susceptible to a heavy dose of congressional 
input.  
VII. Conclusion: The Imperative of a New Approach 
The combination of varied doctrinal inputs and different 
interpretive methodologies in any given subject-area poses a 
serious challenge for congruence and proportionality review. As 
this Article has suggested, credible performance of such review 
will require courts to parse carefully the individual components of 
a given constitutional rights doctrine (such as the right to gun 
possession) to determine which components are amenable to 
which types of congressional input.458  
                                                                                                     
 455. See supra Part III.A (detailing the difficult doctrinal structure that 
defines Second Amendment jurisprudence). 
 456. Indeed, sophisticated defenders of more recent versions of originalism 
explicitly distinguish between (originalist) constitutional “interpretation” and 
so-called “constitutional construction,” which is appropriate when the core 
meaning of the document runs out before deciding a case. See Lawrence B. 
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. L. REV. 923, 
972–90 (2009) (explaining the distinction and applying the distinction in the 
context of the Second Amendment). 
 457. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (stating the 
judiciary’s supreme role in the resolution of cases and controversies). 
 458. See supra Part V (using the Second Amendment example to suggest 
this more nuanced approach to understanding Congress’s enforcement power). 
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Without doubt, this task poses an exceptionally difficult 
challenge. But that challenge must be addressed, unless the 
Court remains content with more simplistic approaches to 
congruence and proportionality.459 Up to now the Court has been 
able to make do with such simplistic approaches, in large part 
because so many of its enforcement power cases have dealt with 
equal protection, which features an ostensibly-simple doctrinal 
structure that, at least on its face, is well-suited to translation 
into the enforcement power context.460 As the Second Amendment 
example makes clear,461 however, the Court may well be on the 
verge of encountering enforcement power cases where the 
underlying right cannot be so easily described. As it encounters 
those more difficult cases, it will have to decide how seriously it 
wants to take both its insistence on stating constitutional 
meaning and its ostensible respect for congressional 
determinations that Congress is best-suited to make. The Court’s 
decisions will determine its true degree of interest in treating the 
national legislature seriously as a partner in the project of 
vindicating constitutional meaning. 
                                                                                                     
 459. See supra Part II.B (charting the Court’s formulaic approach to 
Enforcement Clause cases post-Boerne). 
 460. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003).  
 461. See supra Part III.B (discussing the intricacies of the Second 
Amendment right and the enforcement power). 
